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THE IMPACT OF UNITARY STATUS AND THE END OF 
COURT-ORDERED DESEGREGATION, 1993-2013 
ABSTRACT 
 
In 1991, the United States Supreme Court’s ruling in Board of Education of Oklahoma 
City v. Dowell established guidelines that expedited the lower courts’ ability to terminate court-
ordered desegregation cases, even in cases where racial imbalance was likely to persist. The 
courts refer to districts that have had court cases terminated as operating under “unitary status.”  
Over the next 25 years, the lower courts terminated hundreds of desegregation orders. This 
dissertation examines patterns of racial composition, school finance, and educational attainment 
in 480 school districts operating under unitary status, and compares these patterns to those in 
districts that remained under court oversight as well as those districts with no court-mandated 
desegregation plan in place. These analyses include data from 1993 through 2013 and provide 
significant evidence that unitary districts followed a different trajectory than either districts not 
impacted by the Dowell ruling or districts that remained under court order through 2010.  
In addition to finding both overall changes in racial composition and differing patterns of 
segregation across the subsets of districts analyzed, findings indicate a relationship between 
unitary status and increasing segregation levels over time. Additionally, districts not under court 
order were consistently able to spend more per pupil than districts with active court orders and 
those operating under unitary status. The finance analysis also found that while unitary districts 
were able to spend more on students for some time after court orders terminated, these efforts 
could not be sustained long-term. Finally, an examination of educational attainment showed that 




and high schools with very low levels of education attainment were overrepresented in the 
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This dissertation examines the impact of the Supreme Court’s 1991 Oklahoma City v. 
Dowell decision that permitted terminating court-ordered desegregation plans. Using a multi-
modal analytical analysis, the consequences of the Dowell decision are examined to gauge the 
impact of the ruling on racial composition, school finance, and education attainment patterns 
in districts impacted by the Dowell decision, and contrast these patterns with school districts 
not under court order at the time of the Dowell ruling.  
In 1991, the Supreme Court issued a decision in the Oklahoma City v. Dowell case that 
significantly shifted the legal and policy landscape for many school districts grappling with a 
history of de jure segregation. In this case, the justices ruled 5 to 3 that the lower courts could 
end desegregation cases even when the absence of a court-ordered desegregation plan would 
ensure a return to segregated schools. The Dowell decision gave guidance to lower courts on 
granting what the judiciary refers to as “unitary status.” 
Unitary status was the court’s terminology for a district that had, in the words of the 
Dowell ruling, “complied in good faith with the desegregation decree since it was entered” 
and “the vestiges of past discrimination had been eliminated to the extent practicable” 
(Dowell, cited in Moore, 2002). This declaration of unitary status allowed school districts to 
terminate magnet programs, attendance boundaries, and other programs and policies designed 
to eliminate the impact of de jure segregation and mitigate the effects of de facto segregation. 
Since 1991, the courts have terminated court-ordered desegregation plans in over 200 districts 
that serve over four million students.  
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The Supreme Court was sharply divided on the issues raised by the Dowell case, and 
the dissension hinged on a central idea. The five-justice majority, represented by Chief Justice 
Rheinquist’s opinion in the case, emphasized that the Brown decision considered federal 
intervention in local education policy temporary. Their ruling insisted that full local control be 
restored through unitary status as soon as the “Board had complied in good faith with the 
desegregation decree since it was entered” and “the vestiges of past discrimination had been 
eliminated to the extent practicable” (Dowell, cited in Moore, 2002). This opinion was one of 
a trio of cases, along with Freeman v. Pitts (1992) and Missouri v. Jenkins (1995) that 
permitted and even encouraged the termination of court-ordered desegregation plans. 
Justice Thurgood Marshall, writing for the dissenting justices, raised serious concerns 
about this emphasis on the transitory nature of desegregation orders. Marshall notes that the 
majority decision “fails to recognize explicitly the threatened reemergence of one-race 
schools as a relevant “vestige of de jure segregation.” While the majority opinion considered 
desegregation orders fulfilled once the mechanisms of state-sponsored segregation were 
removed, the dissenting opinion holds that “our school desegregation jurisprudence 
establishes that the effects of past discrimination remain chargeable to the school district 
regardless of its lack of continued enforcement of segregation, and the remedial decree is 
required until those effects have been finally eliminated” (Board of Education v. Dowell, 
1991, p. 498). 
The purpose of this study is to apply an analytical framework to test the hypothesis put 
forth by Justice Marshall and his colleagues in the dissenting opinion to Dowell. Twenty-one 
years of data allow for a comparison of hundreds of unitary districts against districts that 
remain under court supervision as well as districts that were not under desegregation orders in 
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the time of the Dowell ruling. By engaging in a statistical analysis of the racial composition of 
these districts, this dissertation can examine changes in racial composition that occurred since 
the Dowell ruling and determine if patterns of any shifts in racial makeup were unique to 
unitary districts. By examining a comprehensive set of unitary districts and contrasting trends 
in these districts with those districts that remain under court order, this dissertation seeks to 
provide additional evidence about shifts in racial composition of school districts once the 
courts terminate mandatory desegregation plans. 
For many years after the Dowell ruling, there was significant worry that the end of 
court-ordered desegregation plans could undo the progress that school districts had made 
towards racial desegregation throughout the 1970s and 1980s. While there was significant 
worry and debate about the possibility of this “resegregation,” researchers had conducted only 
limited empirical research on resegregation. More recently, Clotfelter, Vigdor, and Ladd 
(2006), Lutz (2006), and Reardon, Grewal, Kalogrides, and Greenberg (2011) all conducted 
research on increasingly comprehensive samples of districts with desegregation orders. This 
analysis will add to this body of research by using a comprehensive dataset over a longer 
period, employing a data panel that includes 21 years of key information on 480 school 
districts that were following court-ordered desegregation plans in 1991 at the time of the 
Dowell ruling. This panel data allows for a longitudinal examination of racial composition of 
school districts over time and permits examination of gradual shifts in racial composition for 
many years after the courts granted unitary status to a school district. 
In addition to examining racial composition, this dissertation also examines finance 
and educational attainment patterns in unitary districts. This examination continues to explore 
the concerns that the dissenting justices in the Dowell decision voice about the critical 
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educational and policy decisions that may be “shaped by and perpetuate the state-created 
message of racial inferiority associated with the school district’s historical involvement in 
segregation” (Board of Education v. Dowell, 1991, p. 498). This examination of fiscal policy 
and education attainment also fills a gap in the current research about unitary districts. While 
numerous researchers have examined unitary districts for evidence of resegregation, little has 
been analyzed or written concerning the education policy and outcomes in these districts. 
Research on districts operating under unitary status is often limited to case studies of a single 
district. Given that districts often argued for the termination of court-ordered desegregation 
plans because they constrained their ability to make autonomous policy decisions, further 
research about post-unitary district policy will help inform consideration of this argument and 
provide valuable information for legal scholars, education researchers, and policy makers.  
Research Questions 
In order to explore the relationship between a district’s desegregation status and other 
key policy outcomes, this study seeks to answer three sets of research questions associated 
with each of the major outcome areas examined. 
Racial Composition 
1.  How has racial composition of post-unitary districts shifted since the Dowell ruling 
in 1991?  
2. How do these changes compare to changes among all public schools as well as 
districts that remain under court order? 
3. Are any changes in racial composition related to the termination of court orders, 




1. Does school finance data for post-unitary districts indicate any change in revenue 
or spending patterns during the post-Dowell era? 
2. Do any changes in spending patterns among post-unitary districts indicate an 
increase or decrease of fiscal support for schools during this period? 
3. Did fiscal patterns change once courts granted districts unitary status? 
Education Attainment 
1. How did educational attainment vary between schools not under court order, 
schools that were under court order, and schools that courts declared unitary 
between 1993 and 2013? 
2. Did patterns in education attainment change after courts declared districts unitary? 
Overview of the Study 
This descriptive study provides an overview of both legal framework for 
desegregation and unitary declarations, as well as the social science research documenting the 
harms of segregation and the benefits of desegregation. Chapter 2 provides the overview of 
the relevant research and literature about the legal framework and an overview of the social 
science research regarding desegregation as well as some additional context for the analytical 
framework employed throughout. 
Chapters 3 through 5 each focus on a separate set of research questions posed by this 
study. Chapter 3 focuses on research questions related to racial composition, Chapter 4 
analyzes the research questions related to school finance, and Chapter 5 examines the 
questions related to educational attainment. While each of these chapters has common ground 
in terms of some of the data points and research method employed for all of the research 
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questions, each chapter has some distinctly different aspects to the methodology used to 
answer specific sets of research questions. Given this structure, this introductory chapter 
includes a “Data Sources” section, and each chapter includes a methodology discussion that 
explains in detail additional data that is unique to that set of research questions as well as the 
research methodology utilized for a specific analysis. 
Chapter 6 examines the conclusions drawn from the findings for each of the research 
questions. This analysis of findings includes recommendations for policymakers and 
considers the results within the context of the Dowell decision. Finally, Chapter 6 discusses 
limitations of this study and makes recommendations for researchers and policymakers about 
topics for further examination.  
Data Sources 
This study uses a 21-year panel of district level data from 1993 through school year 
2013, including data on 480 school districts where court-ordered desegregation rulings were 
in effect at the time of the Supreme Court’s Dowell decision.  
Several sources, including Lexis-Nexis, the Department of Justice, resources made 
available by the Lewis Mumford Center for Comparative Urban and Regional Research, and 
research by Reardon et al. (2011) were used to compile the list of court cases dismissed after 
1991. Although this list of districts may not be exhaustive, it appears to be one of the most 
comprehensive sets of data on districts under court order at the time of the Dowell ruling. 
Initially, this list of desegregation cases included 656 school districts. From this broader list of 
657 districts that had been under court order in 1991, districts with fewer than 2,000 students 
(in 1993) were culled from the list, resulting in a final number of 480 districts that were under 
court order at the time of the Dowell ruling.  
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In order to compare racial composition, finance patterns, and education attainment 
trends from these 480 districts to patterns in districts not affected by court-ordered 
desegregation cases, a dataset was built which included both the 480 desegregation districts 
and all other public school districts with at least 2,000 students from the same states as the 
desegregation districts. Altogether, the entire dataset included 6,567 districts—6,087 of these 
districts were not under court order in 1991 (referred to as “Not under Court Order” in tables 
and figures in this dissertation), 265 of these districts were under court order in 1991 and 
remained under court order through at least 2010 (referred to as “Never Released” in tables 
and figures in this dissertation), and 215 of these school districts were under court order in 
1991 but ruled “unitary” by the courts sometime before 2010 (referred to as “Unitary” in 
tables and figures in this dissertation). Each of these subsets of districts is treated as a distinct 
category in the analyses in this dissertation. The dataset includes data from these districts 
from the 1992-1993 school year (referred to as 1993 for the remainder of the paper) through 
the 2012-2013 school year (hereafter referred to as 2013).  
Overview of the Dataset 
Table 1.1 provides a breakdown of these districts across the three subsets in 1993 and 
2013 by both the number of districts as well as the percentage of the student population 
































265 4% 13% 263 4% 11% 
Unitary 215 3% 11% 214 3% 10% 
 
Only 7% of school districts were under court-ordered desegregation plans at the time of the 
Dowell ruling; they served 24% of the student population in this sample. While the proportion 
of school districts in each subset remains essentially stable across the 20-year panel, the share 
of the student population attending a district that was under court order shrank from 24% to 
21%. 
Region 
Because various regions of the country have differing histories regarding school 
segregation—most notably the Southern states that seceded from the Union during the Civil 
War—this paper analyzes various aspects of the research questions from a regional 
perspective. The paper defines the geographic regions using the regions established by 
Orfield, Frankenberg, Ee, and Kuscera (2014): 
• South: Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, 
South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia;  
• Border: Delaware, Kentucky, Maryland, Missouri, Oklahoma, and West Virginia; 
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• Northeast: Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New 
York, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and Vermont; 
• Midwest: Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska, North 
Dakota, Ohio, South Dakota, and Wisconsin;  
• West: Arizona, California, Colorado, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Oregon, Utah, 
Washington, and Wyoming.  
Given that Hawaii and Alaska have distinctive populations and are largely absent in the legal 
history of segregation in this country, they are not included in this dataset. This analysis treats 
the District of Columbia as a city rather than a state. 
 Not surprisingly, the two subsets of school districts impacted by desegregation 
litigation are disproportionately comprised of Southern districts. Table 1.2 show the 
breakdown of districts across regions in 1993.  
Table 1.2 
Regional Distribution of Desegregation Cases 












South  24% 19% 86% 73% 
Border  8% 6% 4% 7% 
Northeast  22% 26% 4% 2% 
Midwest 28% 36% 3% 15% 
West 6% 13% 3% 6% 
 
When the subsets are disaggregated by region and weighted by student enrollment, 
both the subsets of districts that remain under court order and unitary districts are skewed 
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towards students attending southern districts. Table 1.3 shows the regional disaggregation 
weighted by student enrollment. 
Table 1.3 
Regional Distribution of Desegregation Cases weighted by Student Enrollment 
Region  Total School 
Districts 
(n=38,323,236) 







South  33% 26% 42% 70% 
Border  7% 8% 2% 10% 
Northeast  17% 18% 27% 2% 
Midwest 22% 25% 12% 11% 
West 21% 24% 16% 7% 
 
One final way to consider the regional impact of court-ordered desegregation and its 
termination is to consider the number of students in the region who are served by districts 
under court order at the time of the Dowell ruling, shown in Table 1.4. This disaggregation 
shows that 40% of students in the South, approximately 20 percent of students in the Border 
and Northeast regions, and 15 percent of students in the Midwest and West regions attended 
schools impacted by court-ordered desegregation plans at the time of the Dowell ruling. This 
perspective continues to demonstrate the predominance of desegregation plans in the South, 
but also highlights that significant numbers of students were impacted by court-ordered 
desegregation plans in other parts of the country.  
Table 1.4 
Students Enrolled in Districts Impacted by Dowell Ruling, 1993 
Region  % of students served by 
districts with no court order 
(1993 enrollment) 
% of students served by 
districts never released from 
court order (1993 enrollment) 
% of students served 
by unitary districts 
(1993 enrollment) 
South  60% 17% 23% 
Border  80% 4% 15% 
Northeast  79% 20% 1% 
Midwest 87% 7% 6% 
West 87% 10% 4% 
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The following two maps show the number of districts with a desegregation order in place in 
1993 (see Figure 1.1) and the number of students attending those districts in 1993 (see Figure 
1.2). 
 




Figure 1.2. Number of Students Attending Districts under Court Order by State, 1993 
 
District Size 
The primary reason the two subsets of districts with court orders in 1990 served a 
disproportionately large share of the student population is that these school districts were 
generally larger than school districts with no desegregation order in place. In 1993, the mean 
enrollment in districts never under court order was 4,796 students. Districts that remained 
under court order had a mean enrollment of 18,666 students in 1993. The mean enrollment in 
unitary districts was 19,463 in 1993. For another perspective on district size, consider that 
while only 7% of school districts were under court order at the time of the Dowell ruling, 24% 
of districts with more than 10,000 students had a court-ordered desegregation plan in place in 
1990, and 27 of the 50 largest districts in the dataset in 1993 had court orders in place at the 




In addition to contrasts in district size, districts with court-ordered desegregation plans 
at the time of the Dowell ruling were more likely to be located in the central cities or the 
fringe areas of cities in a given metropolitan area. While only 36% of students in the dataset 
attend city schools, 58% attend schools located in the central city of a metropolitan area. 
When the fringes of these central cities are included, 67% of districts and 83% of students 
impacted by the Dowell ruling attend schools in cities or their fringe areas. The locales of 
districts never under court order may be skewed by the exclusion of districts under 2,000 
students, as these smaller districts may be more likely to be located outside of an urban area, 
and were disproportionately not under court order in 1990. Table 1.5 shows the breakdown of 
student enrollment by locale for the overall dataset as well as each subset analyzed in this 
paper.  
Table 1.5 
Distribution of Desegregation Cases by NCES Locale 








Large City (City Population>250,000) 16% 7% 52% 34% 
Mid-Size City (Central City<250,000) 20% 18% 18% 30% 
Urban Fringe, Large City 18% 21% 6% 10% 
Urban Fringe, Mid-Size City 11% 12% 6% 11% 
Large Town (≥25000) 3% 4% 1% 1% 
Small Town (2500-25000) 19% 23% 9% 7% 
Rural  13% 15% 8% 7% 





The poverty rate in districts that were under court order at the time of the Dowell 
ruling is between 8 and 10 points higher than in districts not under court order throughout the 
panel. For example, in 1993, the poverty rate in districts not under court order was 15 percent, 
the poverty rate for districts continuously under court order was 26 percent, and the poverty 
rate for unitary districts was 24 percent. While the poverty rate rises and falls throughout the 
panel data, the gap between the sets of districts analyzed in this paper remain consistent.  
Judicial Circuit 
Figure 1.3 shows the geographic boundaries of the United States Court of Appeals 
Circuits. At the time of the Dowell ruling in 1990, 66% of the districts under court order were 
under the jurisdiction of either the Fifth or Eleventh circuits of the United States Court of 
Appeals. By 2010, every Circuit but the Fifth Circuit (37%) had released the majority of 
districts that had been under court order at the time of the Dowell decision. 
 
Figure 1.3. United States Court of Appeals Circuits 
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Comparison of District under Court Order and Unitary Districts 
 
There are some aspects of the two subsets of districts that had court orders in place in 
1990 that can also provide helpful context for exploring the research questions that are the 
focus of this paper. This dissertation is review of these sets of districts as having a fixed 
number of districts (265 districts that remained under court order and 215 that the courts 
declared unitary), the number of unitary districts grew over time. Table 1.6 shows the 
breakdown of release years for the 215 districts in this subset.  
Table 1.6 
Number of Districts Declared Unitary, 1991 through 2009 
























1991 476 4 4 123,898 123,898 
1992 474 2 6 148,352 272,250 
1993 472 2 8 39,014 311,264 
1994 467 5 13 242,493 553,757 
1995 461 6 19 140,440 694,197 
1996 455 6 25 326,494 1,020,691 
1997 448 7 32 170,452 1,191,143 
1998 423 25 57 481,187 1,672,330 
1999 415 8 65 147,467 1,819,797 
2000 404 11 76 322,829 2,142,626 
2001 397 7 83 621,417 2,764,043 
2002 375 22 105 407,641 3,171,684 
2003 360 15 120 231,385 3,403,069 
2004 347 13 133 147,557 3,550,626 
2005 327 20 153 203,110 3,753,736 
2006 306 21 174 218,130 3,971,866 
2007 285 21 195 178,288 4,150,154 
2008 275 10 205 70,613 4,220,767 






The Road to Dowell and Beyond: A Legal Context 
 For the past six decades, the Supreme Court’s rulings have prompted significant shifts 
in desegregation policy. Chronologically, the Supreme Court’s decisions regarding race and 
education form four distinct phases in the era of court-ordered desegregation. In each of these 
phases, the Court’s rulings prompted significant legal, political, demographic, and educational 
shifts.  
Phase One: Brown v. Board of Education, 1954-1968  
 The first phase of school desegregation movement, and indeed the entire era of court-
ordered desegregation, rests upon the landmark case Brown v. Board of Education (1954). 
This decision signaled to America’s schools and its citizens that government-imposed 
segregation of public schools was morally and legally unacceptable. In the first Brown case, 
the court unanimously found the “separate but equal” doctrine established in the Plessy v. 
Ferguson case to be fundamentally flawed and concluded racial segregation of public schools 
was inherently unequal. In the decision, Chief Justice Earl Warren noted:  
Today it is a principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in 
preparing him for later professional training, and in helping him to adjust normally to 
his environment. In these days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be 
expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an education. Such an 
opportunity, where the state has undertaken to provide it, is a right that must be made 
available to all on equal terms. (Brown v. Board of Education, 1954, p. 493)  
 
Despite this unequivocal decision, the original Brown decision did not include any 
direction towards remedies for de jure segregation. In a second ruling the following year, the 
Supreme Court only concluded that desegregation occur with “all deliberate speed” (Brown v. 
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Topeka Board of Education, 1955). Unfortunately, this second ruling on Brown did not 
provide any remedies to de jure segregation, failing even to address Linda Brown’s 
prohibition from attending an all-white school in Topeka (Chemerinsky, 2003). Many legal 
scholars have argued that had the lapse between the original Brown ruling and the Court’s 
first foray into specific remedies for segregation in Green v. County School Board of New 
Kent County (1968) not occurred, desegregation and its subsequent integration could have 
taken hold more effectively and assertively pushed segregated schools districts to act 
immediately (Ware, 2005).  
Phase Two: Intensive Desegregation, 1968-1973  
 The case of Green v. County School Board of New Kent County (1968) marked the 
beginning of “aggressive desegregation,” wherein the Court issued its most forceful school 
desegregation rulings. In Green, the Court outlined “tangible” areas such as equal facilities 
and black-white ratios for both faculty and students that courts and schools could use to judge 
the merit of a desegregation plan (Parker, 2004). In Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg (1971), 
the Supreme Court legitimized several specific strategies for desegregation, including busing, 
redrawing attendance zones, and creating attendance zones based significantly on racial 
balance. Not surprisingly, during the era in which the Courts aggressively pursued 
desegregation, the South became the most integrated region of the country, going from less 
than five percent of black students attending majority white schools in 1964 to over 35 
percent in 1972 (Frankenberg, Lee, & Orfield, 2003).  
Phase Three: Setbacks and Slowdowns, 1973-1991  
 This period of aggressive desegregation suffered its first round of serious setbacks in a 
trio of rulings issued by the Supreme Court in the early to mid-1970s. This trifecta of cases 
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marked a third phase in the desegregation movement in which the courts placed certain 
constraints on school desegregation remedies. First, in Keyes v. School District No. 1, Denver, 
Colorado (1973), the Court ruled that constitutional violations occurred only in districts that 
had a discriminative purpose in their policies and regulations (Chemerinsky, 2003). This 
meant that in districts where state law had not prohibited integrated schools, and no school 
board policy clearly created a dual system of schools, the courts could not intervene to 
desegregate schools (Chemerinsky, 2003). While this ruling ensured that the government 
could not intrude upon schools affected by segregation as the result of individual choice, it 
made it nearly impossible for plaintiffs to demonstrate discrimination even in cases where 
government policies in areas other than education directly led to increased segregation in 
schools.  
 San Antonio v. Rodriguez (1973), while not explicitly a case dealing with 
desegregation, created additional obstacles for educators and policy reformers advocating for 
the integration of schools. Plaintiffs in Texas sought to demonstrate that the state’s school 
funding system caused inequalities in school spending between districts (Imber, 2004). 
Further, the plaintiffs argued that the Court should apply strict scrutiny in evaluating their 
equal protection claim based on the arguments that the state finance system discriminated 
against impoverished students and that education was a fundamental right because of its social 
importance (Imber, 2004). The Supreme Court, in a 5-4 opinion, determined that poverty is 
not a suspect classification and thus discrimination against the poor need meet only rational 
basis scrutiny. As Erwin Chemerinsky explains, “The Court explained that where wealth is 
involved, the Equal Protection Clause does not require absolute equality or precisely equal 
advantages” (2003, pp. 1611-1612). Even more importantly, for the first time, the Court stated 
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that education was not a fundamental right guaranteed by the federal Constitution (Imber, 
2004).  
 The Rodriguez decision affected the integration movement by barring districts from 
seeking judicial intervention when seeking equal opportunity (Chemerinsky, 2003). As white 
flight made intra-district integration increasingly difficult, large urban districts had to compete 
with neighboring school districts. Because the central core cities throughout America served a 
disproportionate number of poor students relative to the surrounding school districts, this 
made it difficult to provide a level of educational services that white, middle class parents 
would consider for their children. By denying education status as a fundamental right 
guaranteed by the Constitution, Rodriguez also effectively barred racially isolated school 
districts from seeking fiscal equity in federal courts.  
 The most damning of the three cases decided in the 1970s was Milliken v. Bradley 
(1974). In Milliken, the district courts ordered the use of inter-district integration in order to 
desegregate the Detroit schools. The district court reasoned that because of significant white 
flight to the surrounding districts of Detroit, meaningful integration was only possible if 
students from these districts were required to attend Detroit schools. The Supreme Court ruled 
in a 5-4 decision that before a district court can impose a “cross-district remedy, it must first 
be shown that there has been a constitutional violation within one district that produces a 
significant segregative effect in another district” (Milliken, 1974, p. 418). The Milliken 
decision restricted desegregation to the racial balancing of students within a school district 
regardless of that district’s overall racial imbalance. Regarding the Milliken decision, legal 
scholar Lawrence Friedman stated:  
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The world was made safe for white flight. White suburbs were secure in their grassy 
enclaves.... Official, legal segregation indeed was dead; but what replaced it was a 
deeper, more profound segregation ... Tens of thousands of black children attend 
schools that are all black, schools where they never see a white face; and they live 
massed in ghettos, which are also entirely black. (Friedman, 2002, p. 296) 
 
 This combined impact of this trio of court cases substantially dampened the initial 
push for desegregation, particularly outside of the South. Many legal scholars point in 
particular to Rodriguez and Milliken as particularly devastating decisions for advocates of 
meaningful integration of schools. Dennis Parker (2004) points out: 
In Rodriguez and Milliken, the Supreme Court’s treatment of the educational rights of 
the poor and their discussion of education in general seemed in many ways 
fundamentally at odds with the broad, democratic view of education outlined in the 
Brown decision. In many respects, Rodriguez and Milliken seemed to betray the ideals 
of true equality established in Brown. (p. 1075) 
 
In the years after the first Milliken decision, courts attempted to use a variety of 
remedies to repair the damage of de jure segregation in the face of increasing racial 
imbalance. While the original Milliken decision prevented crossing district boundaries to 
achieve equity in student populations, the Supreme Court focused on intra-district remedies in 
the second Milliken v. Bradley decision (1977). The Court affirmed that the school district of 
Detroit and the state of Michigan would have to provide additional compensatory and 
remedial programs in several critical areas, including reading, teacher professional 
development, testing, and counseling (Milliken v. Bradley, 1977). This decision encouraged 
the use of remedial strategies that focused on closing achievement gaps between black and 
white students rather than ameliorating racial disparities in student enrollment. While federal 
courts continued to monitor desegregation cases throughout the late 1970s and 1980s, the 
desegregation movement languished throughout this period. Congress took its last 
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pro-desegregation action in 1972, and the last federal desegregation aid program was ended 
by the Reagan administration in 1981 (Frankenberg et al., 2003). 
Phase Four: The Post-Unitary Era, 1991-2007 
Beginning in 1991, a new trio of Supreme Court cases began to actively dismantle 
decades of court-ordered desegregation plans. The first case, Board of Education v. Dowell 
(1991), dealt with the termination of court-ordered desegregation cases. Oklahoma City 
Public Schools had employed a system of de jure segregation, and court-ordered 
desegregation remedies had not commenced until 1972. However, a federal court order 
successfully desegregated the Oklahoma City public schools (Chemerinsky, 2003). While the 
court initially found that the board had remedied the effects of segregation in 1977, plaintiffs 
asked the Court to resume active oversight of the district in 1985 (Dowell, 1991), and the 
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit granted their request. While Oklahoma City Public 
Schools fought for the next several years to have the Court release the district from oversight, 
plaintiffs’ lawyers presented compelling evidence that several schools would resegregate if 
the court removed its requirements. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court held that once a school 
system had achieved unitary status—a term the Court introduced to indicate that a district had 
repaired the consequences of a de jure system of segregation— a federal court’s desegregation 
order should end even if termination would lead to resegregation (Chemerinsky, 2003). The 
Court failed to specifically define what constituted unitary status, pointing to assurances that 
school boards had “complied in good faith” and “the vestiges of past discrimination have been 
eliminated to the extent practicable” (cited in Chemerinsky, 2003).  
On the heels Dowell, the Supreme Court allowed district courts to end supervision of 
certain parts of a desegregation order even while other parts of the order were still active in 
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Freeman v. Pitts (1992). In Freeman, the Court allowed a Georgia school district to build a 
new facility in an attendance zone that was predominately white despite being under court 
order that ordered the district to desegregate. The Supreme Court’s decision allowed the 
district to move ahead with this plan despite the fact that the district court had not yet granted 
the school system unitary status in other areas such as black-white ratios among the faculty 
(Chemerinsky, 2003). The Freeman case allowed districts to engage in piecemeal dismantling 
of their court-ordered desegregation plans. 
The final case that the Supreme Court considered in the second wave of cases was 
Missouri v. Jenkins (1995). In Jenkins, the Supreme Court made three significant rulings. 
First, the Court used the Milliken I case to prohibit the Kansas City, Missouri school district 
from implementing a plan to recruit students from outside of the district to attend Kansas City 
schools because no inter-district violation had occurred (Chemerinsky, 2004). The Court also 
prohibited using desegregation funds to increase teacher salaries to attract better-qualified 
teachers to the district. Most notably, the Court declared, “improvement in test scores was 
‘not necessarily required for the State to achieve partial unitary status as to the quality of 
education programs’” (Jenkins, quoted in Imber, 2004, p. 223). This meant that disparity in 
test scores was not a basis for the continuation of a federal court order, and that once a district 
had complied with a desegregation order, the court should grant unitary status regardless of 
student outcomes (Chemerinsky, 2004).  
Advocates of integration often point to Dowell and subsequent cases as the cause of 
the resegregation era of the 1990s (Chemerinsky, 2003; Orfield & Lee, 2004). Indeed, Erwin 
Chemerinsky declared:  
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The three cases—Dowell, Freeman, and Jenkins—together have given a clear signal to 
lower courts: the time has come to end desegregation orders, even when the effect 
could be resegregation. Lower courts have followed this lead. Indeed, it is striking 
how many lower courts have ended desegregation orders in the last decade, even when 
provided with clear evidence that the result will be increased segregation of the public 
schools. (p. 1618) 
 
These cases set the stage for school districts to seek unitary status throughout the 1990s and 
into the 21st century.  
Phase Five: Curtailed Voluntary Integration Plans, 2007-present 
While many districts were still following court-ordered desegregation plans through 
the 1990s, other school districts had enacted voluntary integration plans in the late 20th and 
into the early 21st century. Some districts, such as Jefferson County, Kentucky (home to 
Louisville) adopted voluntary desegregation plans after the conditions of court-ordered plans 
were met, while other districts such as Seattle had adopted integration plans without any court 
involvement. In each of these districts, student assignment policies used race along with a 
variety of other factors when assigning students to schools through a district-wide choice 
program. Both of the districts’ voluntary desegregation plans were challenged in court and 
these challenges were simultaneously considered by the United States Supreme Court in 
Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1 and Meredith vs. 
Jefferson County Board of Education (2007)). Roslyn Mickleson (2008) summarized the 
decisions in the following passage: 
In Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1, the Court 
concluded that the ways Seattle and Louisville school districts used an individual 
student’s race as a component of their voluntary desegregation student assignment 
plans were unconstitutional because the plans were insufficiently narrowly tailored to 
meet the Court’s standards for strict scrutiny. At the same time, five Justices 
recognized the state’s compelling interest in diverse public schools and in overcoming 
the racial isolation within them. Justice Kennedy’s opinion suggested several specific 
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strategies that school districts might employ to achieve diverse schools. (pp. 1173-
1174) 
 
In this decision, Justice Kennedy’s opinion provided the clearest indication of how 
districts might proceed with voluntary desegregation plans in light of the PICS ruling. In the 
4-1-4 decision, Justice Kennedy agreed with the justices opposed to upholding the voluntary 
desegregation plans in that they were not “narrowly tailored” under the test of “strict 
scrutiny,” and the majority of justices found that these circumstances “did not articulate a 
justification for using race in a mechanical way” (Ogletree & Eaton, 2007, p. 90). At the same 
time, Justice Kennedy sided with the pro-integration justices by noting that school districts 
had a “compelling interest” in promoting racial diversity (Parents Involved in Community 
Schools,  n.d.). Specifically, Justice Kennedy noted, “A compelling interest exists in avoiding 
racial isolation, an interest that a school district, in its discretion and expertise, may choose to 
pursue. Likewise, a district may consider it a compelling interest to achieve a diverse student 
population” (cited in Ogletree & Eaton, 2007, p. 292). Justice Kennedy also listed several 
instances in which districts could proactively promote racial diversity with race-conscious 
strategies, including zoning, school site selection, resource allocation, and student recruitment 
(Liu, 2008, p. 66).  
Despite this opening for voluntary integration plans created by Justice Kennedy’s 
opinion in the PICS case, school districts face murky waters when considering voluntary 
integration plans. Since the PICS decision, courts have struck down numerous voluntary 
desegregation plans, and in the case of a Tucson, Arizona, unitary status case, questionably 
applied the PICS decision to terminate a court order focused on ending de jure segregation 
(Ogletree & Eaton, 2007). 
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In 2011, the United States Department of Justice and United States Department of 
Education’s’ Offices of Civil Rights issued a document entitled “Guidance on the Voluntary 
Use of Race to Achieve Diversity and Avoid Racial Isolation in Elementary and Secondary 
Schools” (Ali & Perez, 2011). This document outlined ways that districts can use either non-
racial data (such as socioeconomic level or parents’ educational attainment) or generalized-
race data at the feeder school or zip code level to implement strategies that lead to decreasing 
racial isolation (Ali & Perez, 2011, p. 6). The report also provides practical applications of the 
permissible strategies outlined by Justice Kennedy in the PICS decision. Despite this 
guidance, numerous researchers and legal scholars point to what Frankenberg and DeBray 
(2011, p. 5) refer to as the “chilling effect” that the PICS decision had on districts 
implementing or seeking to implement voluntary integration plans (Frankenberg, 2014; Ryan, 
2007). For districts that seek unitary status in the post-PICS era, they may find themselves not 
able to continue individual components of their mandatory desegregation plans on a voluntary 
basis after seeking unitary status. These decisions are made particularly complex because the 
PICS decision—through its use of a “colorblind” approach to crafting education policy—
seems to prohibit school districts from taking race into account, even if other policies require 
districts to improve outcomes measured through race-disaggregated metrics. As Darby and 
Saatcioglu (2014) noted:  
While Parents Involved had little impact in practice on desegregation—since much of 
the momentum for school desegregation had already been lost—it had considerable 
implications for law and policy orientation because it nullified race as an essential 
frame of reference in examining educational inequality and diminished the relevance 




An Overview of Social Science Research on Desegregation and Integration 
 In addition to the moral, ethical, and legal arguments against school segregation, many 
theories in social science posit that segregated schools have a harmful effect on the short- and 
long-term outcomes of students, and therefore desegregation ameliorates the harmful effects 
of racially segregated schools. Because of the intensive focus on the social science research 
regarding segregation and racial diversity in schools leading up to the Seattle and Louisville 
Supreme Court cases, several metaanalyses about this research were conducted in the past 10 
years, as well as several important new findings that have emerged since the PICS/Meredith 
decision. These comprehensive reviews reveal the “striking contrasts in the scope, breadth, 
quality, age, and interpretations of the social science research literature” (Mickelson, 2008, p. 
1175). When looking at short- and long- term student outcomes, R.A. Mickelson shared the 
following information in her 2008 work synthesizing the amicus curae briefs examining the 
social science related to segregation for the Parents Involved and Meredith cases (see Figure 
2.1). 
Domain of Outcome Short Term Long Term 
Academic • Achievement (Grades, test 
scores) 
• High School graduation 
• Educational Aspirations 
• Educational Attainment 
Intergroup Dynamics • Interracial peers 
• Reduced prejudiced and 
fear, and stereotypes 
 
• Break in the 
intergenerational 
perpetuation of racial 
hostility and fears 
Life Course  • Occupational attainment 
• Integrated neighborhoods 
• Integrated workplace 
• Preparation for citizenship 
in multiracial democracy 
Figure 2.1. Summary of Benefits of Student Integration Plans (Mickelson 2008, p. 1184) 
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When looking at the social science research about student outcomes, many of the 
recent reviews of the research have noted some general trends in the evolution of research 
about segregation and student outcomes over the six decades since the Brown decision. First, 
the quality of data available to researchers has become much more detailed and 
comprehensive (Linn & Welner, 2007) as the data have allowed researchers to employ 
increasingly sophisticated forms of empirical analysis on student outcome and racial diversity 
data (Mickelson & Nkomo, 2012). This in turn has led to research that is able to look more 
specifically at causal relationships between segregation and student outcomes (Hanushek, 
Kain, & Rivkin, 2002).  
Earlier research often called into question any explicit connection between racial 
segregation and academic achievement (Coleman et al., 1966). These earlier studies often 
examined the possibility of a positive association between the implementation of a 
desegregation order and improved levels of academic achievement (Linn & Welner, 2007). 
As social scientists and statisticians developed increasingly sophisticated statistical models, 
compelling new results have been produced using data from these early studies. For example, 
Borman and Dowling (2010) employed hierarchical linear modeling (HLM) to reanalyze the 
data from James Coleman’s landmark 1966 report. This reanalysis overturned the long-held 
findings of the Coleman report, which stated that school characteristics were secondary in 
determining a child’s level of reading proficiency. Instead, Borman and Dowling found that 
up to 40% of the variance in reading proficiency was attributed to school characteristics, and 
that students attending racially segregated schools were much more likely to demonstrate 
lower levels of reading ability. 
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In other cases, recent studies have used more robust datasets to link segregation and 
student achievement. In these studies, the relationship between segregation and academic 
achievement is often stated as a negative relationship between higher levels of segregation 
and lower levels of academic achievement. For example, Hanushek, Kain, and Rivkin (2002) 
examined Texas state-level data and found that black students’ academic achievement suffers 
in schools with higher percentages of black students, and especially for students with higher 
initial levels of academic proficiency. Rumberger and Wilms (1992) found similar results 
across schools with varying levels of segregation in California. In another study looking at 
statewide data in Florida (Borman et al., 2004), researchers found a strong negative 
relationship between high levels of segregation and performance on state accountability tests, 
even after controlling for other demographic, socioeconomic, and policy factors that impacted 
student achievement.  
In their meta-analysis of the amicus briefs filed for the Seattle/Louisville cases, Linn 
and Welner (2007) noted that there were several consistent findings across the research 
examining the relationship between racial diversity and academic achievement: 
Overall, the research evidence supports four primary conclusions regarding the effects 
of racial diversity on academic achievement. First, there is a relatively common 
finding that White students are not hurt by desegregation efforts or adjustments in 
racial composition of schools. Second, although the apparent magnitude of the 
influence is quite variable, there is a relatively common finding that African American 
student achievement is enhanced by less segregated schooling. Third, these positive 
effects for African American students tend to be larger in earlier grades than in later 
grades and larger in studies using experimental designs or longitudinal data sets than 
in cross-sectional studies or studies that lack control groups. Fourth, the earliest 
studies tend to focus on the effects of court-ordered desegregation, and therefore, to 
combine the impacts of racial composition per se with various policy actions 
undertaken to bring about desegregation. The results of these earlier estimates appear 





Recent research findings generally find a similarly positive relationship between 
desegregation and educational attainment, and a corresponding negative relationship between 
segregation and educational attainment. When academic outcomes are considered, several 
studies (Guryan, 2004; Johnson 2011) found that desegregation led to higher levels of 
educational attainment as measured by high school graduation rates. Conversely, Saatcioglu 
(2010) and Lutz (2011) found evidence of increased dropout rates once court-ordered 
desegregation plans ended. Researchers also examined relationships between racial 
segregation and postsecondary access and attainment. Yun and Kurlaender (2004) found that 
students of color from racially segregated schools in California had lower post-secondary 
aspirations than students of color from schools that are more diverse. Teranishi and Parker 
(2010) found that students of color who attend segregated high schools have more difficulty 
when attempting to enroll in postsecondary education. Additionally, the reintroduction of 
segregation was related to decreases in college achievement for students of color while 
offering no benefits to white students (Giersch, Bottia, Mickelson, & Stearns, 2016).  
Reardon and Owens (2014) noted that much of the social science research that has 
been conducted is concerned with the association between school composition and student 
outcomes, which presents a somewhat limited view of the impact of school segregation. 
Instead, Reardon and Owens argued for a model in which segregation might affect the 
distribution of the individual resources and mechanisms that go into producing student 
outputs.  
Research on Unitary Status to Date 
Given that a critical mass of data about unitary districts has emerged only in the past 
ten to fifteen years, the body of scholarly research focused on ending court-ordered 
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desegregation remains small compared to the copious body of research focused on school 
desegregation as a whole. However, several notable studies have focused on districts granted 
unitary status. Most of these studies focused on questions examining the relationship between 
the termination of a court-supervised desegregation plan and evidence of resegregation in 
these districts.  
Two early studies examining the impact of unitary status on districts’ racial 
composition established several influential frameworks for exploring questions related to the 
dismissal of court-ordered desegregation. Byron Lutz, in a 2005 paper for the Federal 
Reserve, found that districts saw modest increases in segregation in the years following the 
dismissal of a court order. Specifically, Lutz found that “approximately 1/2 of the decrease in 
racial segregation achieved by the plans’ implementation is undone” (p. 26). Additionally, 
Lutz’s paper looked at research questions beyond racial composition, examining both dropout 
rates and private school enrollments and the relationship to unitary status. Lutz’s paper was 
important because it established one of the first national datasets of districts that had court 
orders dismissed, though it is worth noting that Lutz built off earlier data collection conducted 
by Logan and Oakley (2004). Lutz found that schools outside the South saw increases in the 
black dropout rate and black private school enrollment rate after dismissal of court orders. 
These findings are also notable for the regional disaggregation Lutz built into his analysis, 
particularly because they produced findings that were notable outside of the South.  
Charles Clotfelter, Jacob Vigdor, and Helen Ladd (2006) conducted another early 
study that informed and influenced future studies of unitary districts. Clotfelter, Ladd, and 
Vigdor examined changes in both racial isolation and racial imbalance in the 100 largest 
districts in the South and Border regions. Clotfelter and his colleagues found increases in the 
 
31 
racial isolation and imbalance, but attributed these findings to demographic changes in the 
metro areas examined. One notable exception was for districts that had cases decided under 
the jurisdiction of the federal Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, where Clotfelter, Ladd, and 
Vigdor found that increases in racial isolation and imbalance could be attributed to the 
termination of court cases. This study was the first focusing on court jurisdiction as part of the 
analysis of the impact of courts granting unitary status, and this dimension was incorporated 
in several future studies.  
A government report published in 2007 by the United States Commission on Civil 
Rights found small but not statistically significant increases in levels of segregation after 
courts released districts from desegregation plans. However, this study reviewed data from a 
calendar year perspective without taking into account the amount of time that had elapsed 
since the termination in court order. Other researchers (notably Reardon, Grewal, Kalogrides, 
& Greenberg, 2012) have noted should lead to a cautious interpretation of the commission 
report’s results.  
In 2009, An and Gamoran published a study that paired 65 unitary districts with non-
unitary similar districts that remained under court order in the same state. An and Gamoran 
found that while there is little evidence of resegregation overall, unitary status did increase 
school segregation and left unitary districts more vulnerable to broader trends in residential 
segregation.  
In 2011, Lutz revisited the topic of unitary school districts and found that districts 
released from court order gradually resegregate for nearly a decade following the terminating 
court order. Further, using an event-study methodology, Lutz was able to establish a much 
stronger causal link between the declaration of unitary status and an increase in segregation 
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indices (Lutz, 2011). Surprisingly, Lutz also found that whites return to districts once unitary 
status is granted. Specifically, Lutz noted: 
Dismissal appears to pull white students back into districts previously under court 
order in the South. This phenomenon may alter metro area demographic patterns and it 
may serve to blunt the negative impact of dismissal, both by moderating the increase 
in segregation and by increasing the resources available to formerly desegregated 
school districts. (Lutz, 2011, p. 165) 
 
More recent work by Reardon, Grewal, Kalogrides, and Greenberg (2012) also 
demonstrated a link between the termination of court-ordered desegregation and a rise in 
segregation. Reardon was able to look at a large panel of data that was evenly balanced 
between districts that had been released from court order and those that had remained under 
court order, with over 200 districts represented in each category. Using the most sophisticated 
empirical and statistical model employed to date, Reardon and his colleagues were able to 
look at segregation levels across regions, federal appeals circuits, and individual grade levels. 
This study also found that segregation gradually increased after courts terminated 
desegregation orders relative to districts that remained under court order and determined a 
causal link between the declaration of unitary status and this rise in segregation levels. 
Reardon et al. noted: 
Segregation levels grow fastest among elementary schools, which typically draw from 
smaller (and therefore more homogeneous) catchment areas under neighborhood-
based assignment plans, and slowest among high schools. In addition, segregation 
grows faster in districts where the pre-release school segregation levels were lowest. 
Because low pre-release school segregation suggests that a desegregation plan was 
particularly effective, this suggests that segregation rises most quickly following 
release in those districts where court-ordered desegregation was most effective at 
reducing segregation. (Reardon et al., 2012, pp. 899-900) 
 
The Reardon et al. study also notes that resegregation was most pronounced in districts in the 
South and in elementary grades.  
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This research has generated a considerable amount of evidence that unitary status 
increases segregation levels. Importantly, most of these studies have concluded that this 
“resegregation” is unique to districts that were following court-ordered desegregation plans at 
the time of the Dowell ruling, and that desegregation has largely continued to decrease across 
public schools as a whole. With the exception of Lutz’s work, these studies also focus 
exclusively on the impact of unitary status on a district’s racial composition. An and Gamoran 
(2016) noted the charge for further research by Reardon and his coauthors:  
Reflecting on recent increases in racial isolation, Reardon et al. (2012) concluded, 
“We do not know, however, whether the increases in school segregation induced by 
the end of court-ordered desegregation plans lead to . . . increases in racial educational 
disparities. This is an important topic for future work” (p. 901). (Reardon et al., cited 





ANALYSIS OF RACIAL COMPOSITION 
 
The most obvious, and potentially concerning, impact of a unitary ruling is its 
potential to change the racial composition of the schools in the city. This concern about a new 
student reassignment plan causing schools in Oklahoma City to revert to segregated status 
was the impetus for the Dowell case that introduced the notion of unitary status to the legal 
system in 1991. This chapter examines this potential relationship between the courts’ 
termination of desegregation plans and increases in segregation in post-unitary school 
districts. 
Based on these circumstances, this chapter focuses on the following research 
questions: 
1. How has racial composition of post-unitary districts shifted since the Dowell ruling 
in 1991?  
2. How do these changes compare to changes among all public schools as well as 
districts that remain under court order? 
3. Are any changes in racial composition related to the termination of court orders, 
and if so, how long does it take these changes to emerge? 
Opponents of court-ordered desegregation plans made their case to terminate judicial 
oversight of desegregation plans by highlighting the amount of time, energy, and resources 
that districts put into complying with these plans even though by the 1980s, many of these 
plans had plateaued in terms of integrating school districts. At the same time, opponents of 
court-ordered desegregation plans lamented the local control and autonomy that school 
districts had to sacrifice due to court oversight of desegregation plans, arguing that districts 
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under court mandate continued to pay for segregationist policies that districts adopted and 
abandoned decades before. 
Those arguing for the continuation of court-ordered desegregation plans noted the 
gains that had been made under the plans, the safe space that court-ordered desegregation 
plans gave to school district and other local officials when implementing controversial 
measures intended to reduce segregation and its undesirable outcomes, and the historical lack 
of initiative to combat segregation prior to the court’s involvement. Without court-ordered 
desegregation plans, advocates argued, school districts and the communities they represented 
might not have the political will to continue policies that reduced segregation and maintained 
higher levels of integration. If school districts discontinued policies embedded within the 
court-ordered desegregation plans, segregation would return to these districts, and the absence 
of court oversight would allow districts to make policy and program decisions that were either 
explicitly or implicitly inequitable to minority students (An & Gamoran 2009; Clotfelter et al., 
2006; Mickelson, 2005; Reardon et al. 2012; Frankenberg, Lee, & Orfield, 2003).  
This chapter tests the hypotheses of advocates for court-ordered desegregation plans. 
If advocates for court-mandated desegregation plans are correct, then we should see an 
increase in racial inequality and in key components of education policy and programming, 
such as spending on instruction in these school districts. Over time, these inequitable 
decisions could result in a decrease in educational outcomes for students in districts that had 
been under court order at the time of the Supreme Court’s Dowell ruling. This broad survey of 
changes in racial composition, district fiscal policy, and educational outcomes does not allow 
for a deep examination of the decision-making processes in individual districts that saw their 
court-ordered desegregation plans terminated. However, evidence of a pattern of 
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resegregation, changes in resource allocation, or in educational outcomes would provide other 
researchers with a focal point and a backdrop to examine individual districts more carefully.  
Shifts in Racial Composition, 1993-2013 
Several researchers have seen changes in the racial composition of desegregated 
districts as paralleling changes in the larger public school population (Logan, Oakley, & 
Stowell, 2006; Clotfelter et al., 2006). A reasonable test of any hypothesis examining changes 
in unitary districts, therefore, should also examines changes during the same period in all 
public schools. Additionally, districts that courts have ordered to desegregate may share 
unique characteristics related to their unitary status, which also requires examining changes in 
racial composition in these districts as well as those districts that were declared unitary. 
Because of these characteristics, the analyses in this chapter break districts into three distinct 
subsets: 
1. The subset of districts that were not following a court-ordered desegregation plan 
at the time of the Dowell ruling in 1991. This is by far the largest of the three 
subsets of districts, with 6,087 of the 6,567 districts included in the dataset falling 
into this subset of districts in 1993.  
2. The subset of districts that were following a court-ordered desegregation plan at 
the time of the Dowell ruling, and that remained under court order through 2010. 
This subset includes 265 of the 6,567 districts in the dataset. 
3. The subset of districts that were following a court-ordered desegregation plan at 
the time of the Dowell ruling, but were granted unitary status by the courts 
sometime between 1991 and 2010. This subset includes 215 of the 6,567 districts 
in the dataset. 
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This schema helps establish a model for analyzing changes in racial composition and 
segregation levels across these three subsets of school district. Table 3.1 provides a snapshot 
comparison of racial composition in 1993 and 2013, and in the changes in that composition 
both for all school districts and specifically for districts implementing court-ordered 
desegregation plans.  
Table 3.1 
Summary of Racial Composition, 1993 and 2013 
  Year  
   1993 
 
2013 Change 
All Schools Mean White Enrollment (pct.) 61.1 50.7 -10.4 
 Mean Black Enrollment (pct.) 15.9 15.8 -0.1 
 Mean Hispanic Enrollment (pct.) 12.0 24.5 12.5 
 Mean Asian Enrollment (pct.) 3.1 4.9 1.8 
 Total Number of Students 38,263,328 45,138,347 18.0 
     
Never Under Order Mean White Enrollment (pct.) 68.0 55.7 -12.3 
 Mean Black Enrollment (pct.) 10.5 11.7 1.2 
 Mean Hispanic Enrollment (pct.) 10.4 23.7 13.3 
 Mean Asian Enrollment (pct.) 3.0 4.9 1.9 
 Total Number of Students 29,130,662 35,578,823  22.1 
     
Never Released Mean White Enrollment (pct.) 34.9 29.9 -5.1 
 Mean Black Enrollment (pct.) 32.4 29.3 -3.1 
 Mean Hispanic Enrollment (pct.) 22.3 32.6 10.3 
 Mean Asian Enrollment (pct.) 3.8 5.8 2.0 
 Total Number of Students 4,946,709 4,966,772 0.4 
      
Released at Some 
Point 
Mean White Enrollment (pct.) 44.3 34.1 -10.2 
 Mean Black Enrollment (pct.) 33.4 33.2 -0.1 
 Mean Hispanic Enrollment (pct.) 11.1 25.8 14.7 
 Mean Asian Enrollment (pct.) 2.8 3.8 1.1 
 Total Number of Students  4,185,957 4,592,752 9.7 
Note. Standardized beta coefficients = * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 




Table 3.1 first reports demographic trends for all schools. In 1993, the universe of 
students in the dataset consisted of 29,130,662 students: 61% percent of students identifying 
as white, just under 16% of students identifying as African-American, 12% of students 
identifying as Hispanic, and 3.1% of students identifying as Asian. Over the next 21 years, the 
number of students included in the dataset increased just over 22%, or about 6.8 million 
students. There are notable shifts in the racial composition of the dataset over the 21-year 
period as well. The percentage of white students dropped by 10.4%, and was just barely the 
majority in 2013, with 50.4% of students identifying as white that year. While the proportion 
of black students remained essentially flat, the proportion of Hispanic students more than 
doubled, from 12 to 24.5 percent. There was a small increase of 1.8 in the share of students 
identifying as Asian.  
Not surprisingly, the demographic shifts in the largest subset in the sample, school 
districts that were not under court order at the time of the Dowell ruling, largely parallel the 
trends reported for the entire sample. There is substantial overall growth in the number of 
students, and a significant decline in the percentage of the student population made up of 
white students. Additionally, there is a significant increase in the proportion of the student 
population made up of Hispanic students, and a small increase in the share of Asian students. 
While the proportion of the entire sample consisting of African-American students is 
essentially flat, there is a small increase in the proportion of African-American students in the 
subset of schools not under court order, increasing by 1.2% over the 21-year period. Asian 
enrollment increased by 1.9% over the same period.  
There are several notable differences when comparing trends from districts that were 
under court order at the time of the Dowell ruling and remained under court order until at least 
 
39 
2010. First, enrollment in these districts was virtually flat over the 21-year period analyzed, 
indicating that shifts in racial composition are not tied to overall shifts in the size of the 
student population. Additionally, these districts enrolled a much higher share of students of 
color in 1993 than districts not under court order. Districts under court order were already 
majority minority in 1993, with white students making up 35% of total enrollment, black 
students making up 32%, Hispanic students making up 22% of the population, and Asians 
making up 3.8% of the total enrollment. Not only did these districts have different racial 
compositions in 1993, but also racial composition shifted in different ways through 2013. The 
share of white students declined, but not as dramatically as in districts not under court order, 
with a 5-point decline in districts under court order compared to a 12-point decline in districts 
not under court order. Districts under court order also saw a modest decline of 3.1 points in 
the share of African-American students, and the smallest increase in the share of Hispanic 
students of any of the subsets of districts (10.3 points). A slight increase in the proportion of 
students identifying as Asian parallels the trend in the other subsets of districts.  
The shifts in racial composition across unitary districts followed the shifts for all 
schools, but with less growth in the student population than for the total sample. While the 9.7 
point increase in overall student population was roughly half that of the sample overall, it is 
still notable when compared to the flat growth rate of districts that remained under court order 
after the Dowell ruling. Unitary districts also experienced declines in white enrollment at 
about the same rate as all districts (a 10.2 decline for unitary districts), a stable share of black 
enrollment, and a significant increase in Hispanic enrollment of 14.7 points, the largest 
increase in Hispanic enrollment of any of the subsets.  
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 This initial review of racial enrollment patterns across the period studied highlights 
several important distinctions between the subsets of districts. First, districts under court order 
at the time of the Dowell ruling had much lower shares of white enrollment in 1993. Both 
unitary districts and districts that remained under court order were already on average 
majority-minority in 1993. This means that in many of these districts, substantial white flight 
had already occurred, so it was not surprising that declines in white enrollment are less 
dramatic than in districts not under court order at the time of the Dowell ruling. At the same 
time, the low levels of white enrollment at the beginning of the study period means that any 
declines in white enrollment are likely to have a greater impact in terms of racial isolation 
within both unitary districts and districts under court order.  
In addition to the differences in white enrollment patterns, districts under court order 
did not increase their student enrollment, unitary districts experienced moderate growth, and 
districts not impacted by Dowell experienced the greatest increases in student enrollment. 
This is significant because it suggests that districts not under court order may have 
experienced demographic shifts due to substantial growth driven by students of color. In 
districts consistently under court order, however, there is no corresponding growth. This 
means that the decrease in white enrollment was likely due more to the continued exit of 
white families out of these school systems rather than a stable number of white students 
representing a smaller share of the total enrollment in a larger overall student population. 
Therefore, the argument that societal demographic shifts driving resegregation through the 
1990s and 2000s made by some researchers does not seem to apply to districts under court 
order during that period (An & Gamoran, 2009; Logan, 2004). 
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While the shifts in enrollment patterns nationally illustrates some differences between 
desegregation districts and the public school universe as a whole, these differences are even 
more striking when examined at the regional level. Table 3.2 summarizes these regional 
shifts. The enrollment in districts following court orders grew more slowly in every region of 
the country, but actually showed declines across desegregation districts in the Border, 
Northeast, and Midwest regions of the country. While all regions showed significant declines 
in the share of the student population made up of white students, these regions with declining 
overall enrollment in desegregation districts also saw the most significant drop in the 
proportion of the student population made up of white students. By 2013, only approximately 
one out of five students in districts under court order were white in the Northeast and West 
regions of the country. 
For the districts under court order in most regions, black enrollment remained 
relatively flat between 1993 and 2013, and there were substantial increases in the proportion 
of the student population made up of Hispanic students. Interestingly, the West region showed 
a decline in the proportion of black students enrolled in desegregation districts, and these 
districts were majority Hispanic by 2013. Given the history of desegregation in the West, 






Summary of Regional Enrollment by Desegregation Status, 1993, and 2013 
Region 1993 Enrollment 2013 Enrollment Change Pct. Change 
South     
Never under Order 7,568,220 10,037,253 2,469,033 32.6% 
Never Released 2,095,524 2,219,691 124,167 5.9% 
Released at Some Point 2,917,938 3,402,502 484,564 16.6% 
Border     
Never under Order 2,218,664 2,719,881 501,217 22.6% 
Never Released 120,347 118,916 (1,431) -1.2% 
Released at Some Point 424,620 418,498 (6,122) -1.4% 
Northeast     
Never under Order 5,265,389 5,740,971 475,582 9.0% 
Never Released 1,326,719 1,241,476 (85,243) -6.4% 
Released at Some Point 82,932 70,789 (12,143) -14.6% 
Midwest     
Never under Order 7,175,559 7,196,305 20,746 0.3% 
Never Released 615,730 575,092 (40,638) -6.6% 
Released at Some Point 469,564 386,535 (83,029) -17.7% 
West     
Never under Order 6,962,738 9,910,095 2,947,357 42.3% 
Never Released 788,389 811,597 23,208 2.9% 
Released at Some Point 290,903 314,428 23,525 8.1% 
Total     
Never under Order 29,190,570 35,604,505 6,413,935 22.0% 
Never Released 4,946,709 4,966,772 20,063 0.4% 
Released at Some Point 4,185,957 4,592,752 406,795 9.7% 
 
Desegregation Indices 
An examination of desegregation indices provides a deeper layer of analysis to 
identify differences between all schools, schools implementing court-ordered desegregation 
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plans at the time of the Dowell ruling, and districts that had terminated those court orders 
since 1991. Social scientists have developed segregation indices over the past 75 years in 
order to better measure differences between groups of people in social science work (Reardon 
& Firebaugh, 2002). James and Tauber (1985) proposed four criteria for analyzing the quality 
of segregation measures: 
• Size invariance –The index should be unaffected by the size of the area(s) used for 
analysis. For example, the same picture should emerge nationally and locally. 
• Organizational equivalence –The index should be unaffected by changes in the 
number of sub-areas, by combination for example of two sub-areas on the same 
“side” of the line of no segregation. 
• Principle of transfers –The index should be capable of being affected by the 
movement of one individual from sub-area to sub-area. 
• Composition invariance –The index should be unaffected by scaling of columns or 
rows, through increases in the ‘raw’ figures which leave the proportions otherwise 
unchanged. (James & Tauber, 1985, cited in Taylor, Gorard, & Fitz, 2000, p. 2) 
 
Over the past several decades, researchers have frequently relied on these criteria in order to 
gauge the validity of various segregation indices.  
Also during the 1980s, Massey and Denton evaluated the qualities of various binary 
measures of segregation on several factors—with the most frequent dimensions reflected in 
research about racial segregation examining the dimension of evenness and exposure (Massey 
& Denton, 1988). Massey and Denton (1988), Massey (2012), Wilkes and  Iceland (2004), 
and others argued that rather than seeking to find a single, “correct” measure of segregation, 
researchers benefit from calculating multiple measures of segregation to examine the extent of 
segregation from multiple perspectives. In fact, Massey and Denton (1989, 1993) have labeled 
instances where multiple measurements document that a group is segregated as instances of 
“hypersegregation.” Reardon and Firebaugh (2002) pointed out that while many of the 
measures outlined by Massey and Denton do an admirable job of quantifying segregation 
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between two different groups of people—white and black students, for example—there are 
more sophisticated measures that can take the segregation between multiple groups of people 
into account when calculated. In their 2002 paper, Reardon and Firebaugh went on to endorse 
the entropy index as a particularly useful measure of multi-group segregation. In order to gain 
a robust understanding of how segregation is impacted by the presence or absence of a court 
order, this analysis examines three separate measures of segregation—the exposure index, the 
dissimilarity index, and the entropy index. While these measures give this analysis depth, 
there is not enough information included here to deem school districts “hypersegregated” due 
to the lack of information in the dataset about the three categories of segregation measurement 
that incorporate spatial analysis—concentration, clustering, and centralization.  
Massey and Denton define evenness as the “differential distribution of two groups 
among real units in a city” (1988, p. 283). The measure of evenness used in this analysis is the 
dissimilarity index, which has been one of the most consistently used measures of segregation 
since being introduced by Duncan and Duncan 60 years ago (1955). Despite some criticism, 
the endurance of the dissimilarity index seems largely because it appears to meet all of the 
criteria established by James and Tauber (Taylor, Gorard, & Fitz, 2000). The dissimilarity 
index is defined as the degree to which two groups (e.g., blacks and whites) are evenly spread 
throughout a given geographical area—in this case, a school district (Dixon, Singleton, & 
Straits, 2015). The formula for the Dissimilarity Index determining the segregation of white 
students from black students is stated as: 
 D=(1/2) SUM |(bi/B-wi/W)| 
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where bi represents the number of black students in a given school, B represents the total 
number of black students in a school district, wi represents the number of white students in a 
given school, and W the total number of white students across a school district.  
The second segregation index used in this analysis is the exposure index. Massey and 
Denton noted, “[Residential] exposure refers to the degree of potential contact or the 
possibility of interaction, between minority and majority group members within geographic 
areas” (1988, p. 287). The exposure index measures the extent to which members of minority 
group B are exposed to majority group B, and is expressed as: 
 X=SUM (wi/W) x (bi/ti) 
In this measure, wi is defined as the white population of a specific school, W is defined as the 
total white population of the school district, bi is defined as the black population of a given 
school within the district, and ti is defined as the total population of the given school. The 
exposure index indicates the likelihood of a minority student interacting with a majority-
group student and is dependent on both the overall number and the distribution of minority 
students across a school district.  
The third segregation index utilized in this analysis is the entropy index, sometimes 
called the information theory index. While Massey and Denton (1988) categorized the entropy 
index as a measure of evenness, its benefit to this analysis beyond the dissimilarity index is 
that the entropy index measures evenness across multiple groups rather than just across two 
groups such as black students and white students. Because of this, Reardon and Firebaugh 
(2002) referred to the entropy index as a measure of diversity, in that it measures the ratio of 
between-unit diversity to total diversity. Iceland (2004) defined the entropy index as: 
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The weighted average deviation of each unit’s entropy from the [district]-wide 









where ti refers to the total population of school i, T is the district population, n is the 
number of schools, and Ei and E represent school i’s diversity (entropy) and the 
district’s diversity, respectively. The entropy index varies between zero, when all 
areas have the same composition as the entire metropolitan area (i.e., maximum 
integration), to a high of one, when all areas contain one group only (maximum 
segregation). (p. 8) 
 
Iceland then pointed out that the entropy index “measures how evenly groups are distributed 
across [a district’s schools], regardless of the size of each of the groups” (p. 8). 
Examining the Relationship between Desegregation Indices 
And Desegregation Status 
By calculating linear regressions that examine that relationship between the various 
desegregation indices and the desegregation status of districts for black and white students 
across the years included in the panel, this chapter examines the patterns of change in the 
segregation levels in the different subsets of districts. This chapter examines the dissimilarity 
index between both white and black as well as white and Hispanic students, the black-white 
exposure index, the Hispanic-white exposure index, and the white-Black isolation index, the 
white-Hispanic isolation index, and the multi-group entropy index. The regression equations 
used for these models are: 
Model 1: Yit= βX1it  +α+uit+eit 
Model 2: Yit = βX1it + βX2it +α+uit+eit 
Model 3: Yit = βX1it + βX2it + βX3it +α+uit+eit 
Model 4: Yit = βX1it + βX2it + βX3it + βX4it +α+uit+eit 




Y represents the dissimilarity index for school district i in year t, the dependent 
variable in all models. The standardized beta coefficients (β) for the independent variables in 
each stepwise model are reflected in the series of equations, where X1 represents 
desegregation status, X2 reflects poverty rate, X3 reflects the region, and X4 reflects the year. 
The symbol α represents the intercept in each equation, while u represents the between district 
error and e represents the within district error. Results of these models are shown in Table 3.3. 
When examining the black-white dissimilarity index, the existence of a court-ordered 
desegregation plan at the time of the Dowell ruling had a statistically significant relationship 
to an increased white-black dissimilarity index. In the simpler models, unitary districts exhibit 
a larger coefficient than districts that remained under court order, but the two subsets exhibit 
nearly identical coefficients in the more sophisticated models (Models 3 and 4). These results 
are not surprising, given these districts’ historical segregation levels.  
In all of the black-white dissimilarity models, poverty rate is correlated with increased 
dissimilarity indices, with the relationship between poverty rate and dissimilarity index 
exceeding that of desegregation status and dissimilarity index in every model. Additionally, 
every region of the country but the Northeast exhibited a statistically significant, positive 
association with an increased dissimilarity index compared to the South region. This 
relationship between region and segregation as measured by the dissimilarity index was 







Stepwise Regression Models Using Black-White Dissimilarity Index as the Dependent 
Variable 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Never Released 0.057*** 0.045*** 0.072*** 0.071***  
 (0.00229) (0.00233) (0.00238) (0.00237)  
Unitary 0.065*** 0.056*** 0.072*** 0.070***  
 (0.00253) (0.00255) (0.00257) (0.00255)  
Poverty Rate 
(SAIPE) 
 0.067*** 0.080*** 0.103*** 0.102*** 
  (0.00445) (0.00490) (0.00500) (0.00500) 
Border   0.064*** 0.065*** 0.065*** 
   (0.00183) (0.00181) (0.00181) 
      
Northeast   -0.004 0.007 0.007 
   (0.00143) (0.00143) (0.00143) 
Midwest   0.168*** 0.176*** 0.176*** 
   (0.00134) (0.00134) (0.00134) 
West   0.116*** 0.121*** 0.121*** 
   (0.00147) (0.00147) (0.00146) 






    Coefficients for 
Individual 
Interactions Included 
in Figure 3.1 
N 151070 149879 149879 149879 149879 
R2 0.007 0.012 0.040 0.054 0.055 
Note. Standardized beta coefficients = * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 





In Model 5, the interaction between desegregation status and year served as the 
primary independent variable. The coefficients representing these interactions are included in 
Figure 3.1.  
 
Figure 3.1. Coefficients Representing Relationship between Dissimilarity Index and the 
Interaction between Desegregation Status and Year 
As Figure 3.1 indicates, the subset of districts not impacted by court-ordered 
desegregation in 1991 demonstrates a different relationship to the dissimilarity index 
compared to districts that continued under court order or that received unitary status from the 
courts. For districts not under court order, the coefficients reflecting the association with the 
dissimilarity were negative and grew increasingly negative between 1994 and 2013. This 
would indicate that segregation between whites and blacks as measured by the dissimilarity 
index persistently decreased. In contrast, districts that either were under court order through 
2010 or declared unitary at some point exhibit a pattern that is essentially flat between 1994 
and 2013. Further, this pattern is not statistically significant for unitary districts after 2007. 
 In addition to running regression models using the black-white dissimilarity index, the 
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white students. This model used the Hispanic-white dissimilarity index as the dependent 
variable. All models demonstrated overall significance at the p<0.001 level and are included 
in Table 3.4. As with the white-black dissimilarity index, the models consistently produce a 
positive, statistically significant association between a district remaining under court order or 
receiving unitary status and the level of segregation measured by the white-Hispanic 
dissimilarity index. The coefficients calculated for districts that remained under court order 
are slightly higher throughout all five models. Poverty rate also has a positive, statistically 
significant relationship with the white-Hispanic dissimilarity index, and the strength of this 
association exceeds the relationship between desegregation status and the dissimilarity index. 
Every region of the country except the West region has a negative association with the 
dissimilarity index, while the West region demonstrates a small, negative relationship with the 
white-Hispanic dissimilarity index. This is interesting given the concentration of Hispanic 
students in the West region.  
Model 5 uses the interaction between desegregation status and year as the primary 
independent variable in the regression model. Figure 3.2 demonstrates the coefficients 
produced by this variable and illustrates differing segregation patterns between white and 
Hispanic students in the three subsets of school districts. The contrasts in these patterns are 
similar to those demonstrated when examining the dissimilarity levels between white and 
black students, with districts not under court order in 1991 demonstrating a negative 
relationship with the white-Hispanic dissimilarity index that grows over time. Districts under 
court order and unitary districts, however, demonstrate a pattern that is almost flat, with a 
weak, positive relationship in 1993 that very gradually tapers to a weak, negative relationship 
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by 2013. These patterns indicate that segregation levels between whites and Hispanics were 
higher in districts with court orders in place when the Supreme Court decided Dowell, and 
Table 3.4 
Stepwise Regression Models Using White-Hispanic Dissimilarity Index as the Dependent 
Variable 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Never Released 0.125*** 0.106*** 0.111*** 0.109***  
 (0.00221) (0.00224) (0.00231) (0.00227)  
Unitary 0.111*** 0.096*** 0.097*** 0.094***  
  (0.00245) (0.00246) (0.00249) (0.00244)  
Poverty Rate 
(SAIPE) 
 0.108*** 0.119*** 0.157*** 0.158*** 
  (0.00429) (0.00476) (0.00479) (0.00479) 
Border   0.079*** 0.082*** 0.082*** 
   (0.00177) (0.00174) (0.00174) 
Northeast   0.014*** 0.031*** 0.031*** 
   (0.00139) (0.00137) (0.00137) 
Midwest   0.067*** 0.081*** 0.081*** 
   (0.00130) (0.00128) (0.00128) 
West   -0.048*** -0.039*** -0.039*** 
   (0.00143) (0.00140) (0.00140) 










N 151043 149863 149863 149863 149863 
R2 0.027 0.038 0.051 0.090 0.090 
Note. Standardized beta coefficients = * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 





that segregation persisted even while segregation between white and Hispanic student 
decreased. This relationship persists even when controlling for poverty level and region. 
 
Figure 3.2. Coefficients Representing Relationship between White-Hispanic Dissimilarity 
Index and the Interaction between Desegregation Status and Year 
Exposure Index 
To examine patterns related to districts’ black-white exposure index, the five 
regression models employed in this chapter were fitted using the black-white exposure index 
as the dependent variable, and the independent variables described for each model. Each of 
these models focusing on the exposure index were statistically significant at the p<0.01 level 
and the results are included in Table 3.5. 
In each of the models using black-white exposure index as the dependent variable, 
there is a negative, statistically significant relationship between the presence of a court-
ordered desegregation plan in 1991 and the exposure index. Because lower exposure index 
values indicate higher levels of segregation, these values indicate a link between the presence 
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simpler models indicate that unitary status has a greater impact on segregation than districts 
under court order, the difference between the two subsets of districts becomes negligible 
when additional variables are added into the more complex models. When poverty rate is 
introduced into the regression models, it has a significant, substantially negative impact on the 
exposure rates. Each of the regions in the model have a statistically significant, positive 
impact on the exposure index when compared against the South region that serves as the base 
level for the regional variable. 
Table 3.5 
Stepwise Regression Models Using Black-White Exposure Rate as the Dependent Variable 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Never Released -0.417*** -0.289*** -0.273*** -0.268***  
 (0.000702) (0.000635) (0.000638) (0.000635)  
Unitary -0.370*** -0.288*** -0.267*** -0.265***  
 (0.000732) (0.000646) (0.000663) (0.000659)  
Poverty Rate (SAIPE)  -0.449*** -0.444*** -0.462*** -0.463*** 
  (0.00194) (0.00197) (0.00201) (0.00201) 
Border Region   0.038*** 0.038*** 0.038*** 
   (0.000715) (0.000710) (0.000710) 
Northeast Region   0.021*** 0.019*** 0.019*** 
   (0.000582) (0.000578) (0.000578) 
Midwest Region   0.061*** 0.059*** 0.059*** 
   (0.000530) (0.000527) (0.000526) 
West Region   0.115*** 0.114*** 0.114*** 
   (0.000534) (0.000530) (0.000530) 






    Individual 
Coefficients in 
Figure 3.3 
N 1536493 1530677 1530677 1530677 1530677 
R2 0.277 0.459 0.469 0.476 0.476 
Note. Standardized beta coefficients = * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 





Model 5 examines the relationship between the interaction between desegregation 
status and year and the exposure index value. Figure 3.3 charts these coefficients and 
illustrates the different patterns exhibited by the three subsets of school districts. 
 
Figure 3.3. Coefficients Representing Relationship between Black-White Exposure Index and 
the Interaction between Desegregation Status and Year 
These patterns indicate statistically significant differences between districts not under 
court order in 1991 and districts that were impacted by the Dowell ruling. Black students in 
school districts not under court order were more likely to see increases in exposure to black 
students over time, while black students in both unitary districts and districts that remained 
under court order were likely to experience decreasing exposure to white students between 
1993 and 2013. 
 This analysis also examines the exposure index between Hispanic and white students 
across the three different subsets of school districts. The regression equations used the same 
independent variables and substituted Hispanic-white exposure index as the dependent 
variable. All five of the regression equations produced results that overall were statistically 































 Stepwise Regressions Using Hispanic-White Exposure Index as the Dependent Variable 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Never Released -0.232*** -0.098*** -0.111*** -0.110***  
 (0.000804) (0.000746) (0.000700) (0.000694)  
Unitary -0.132*** -0.046*** -0.091*** -0.090***  
 (0.000839) (0.000758) (0.000728) (0.000720)  
Poverty Rate 
(SAIPE) 
 -0.472*** -0.473*** -0.475*** -0.476*** 
  (0.00227) (0.00216) (0.00219) (0.00219) 
Border Region   0.080*** 0.078*** 0.078*** 
   (0.000784) (0.000775) (0.000774) 
Northeast Region   -0.075*** -0.077*** -0.077*** 
   (0.000638) (0.000631) (0.000630) 
Midwest Region   0.027*** 0.024*** 0.023*** 
   (0.000582) (0.000575) (0.000574) 
West Region   -0.302*** -0.301*** -0.301*** 
   (0.000586) (0.000579) (0.000578) 










N 1536493 1530677 1530677 1530677 1530677 
R2 0.065 0.265 0.370 0.384 0.386 
Note. Standardized beta coefficients = * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
Standard errors in parentheses 
 
In all of the models, there was a negative, statistically significant relationship between 
the subsets of districts that had a court order in place at some point and the Hispanic-white 
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exposure index. This indicates that Hispanic students in these districts were less likely to be 
exposed to white students. Poverty had a strong, negative, statistically significant relationship 
with the Hispanic-white exposure rate. Regional coefficients varied, with Hispanic students in 
the Border and Midwestern region slightly more likely to be exposed to white students 
compared to the South (used as the base level for regional variables), and Hispanic students in 
the Northeast and West less likely to be exposed to white students. Notably, the negative 
relationship was far stronger between the Hispanic-white exposure index in the West region 
and any other region of the country. 
As Figure 3.4 indicates, the patterns across the three categories are more similar than 
with other measures of desegregation, with each subset showing an initial increase in the 
positive relationship with the Hispanic-white exposure rate, and then a gradual decrease and 
stabilization. However, the strength of the positive relationship for districts not under court 
order is stronger than that for the districts that remained under court order or for unitary 
districts, and the decrease in the middle of the 1990s is larger as well.  
 
Figure 3.4. Coefficients Representing Relationship between Hispanic-White Exposure Index 
































In addition to examining patterns, using binary desegregation measures as the 
dependent variable, analyses were also conducted the information theory index, a multi-group 
measure of segregation. Because the information theory index looks at the levels of diversity 
across all racial groups, it serves as perhaps the best metric to gauge the accuracy of claims 
that demographic changes had more to do with increases in binary segregation metrics like the 
dissimilarity metric than actual increases in segregation levels. A higher information theory 
index indicates a higher level of segregation across all racial groups in the school district.  
Table 3.7 includes the regression models used to examine relationships between the 
information theory index and desegregation status. These models demonstrated overall 
statistical significance at the p<0.001 level. In all five models, the presence of a court-ordered 
desegregation plans at the time of the Dowell ruling correlates with a higher level of 
segregation as measured by the information theory index. Unlike the regressions using other 
indices as the dependent variable, all models using the information theory index indicate 
slightly higher levels of segregation in districts that remain under court order compared to 
unitary districts. Poverty level has a strong, positive, statistically significant impact on the 
information theory index in all models. The Border, Midwest, and West regions all 
demonstrate a small, positive, statistically significant relationship with the information theory 
index, while the Northeast has a small, positive, statistically significant relationship with the 





Stepwise Regression Models Using Information Theory Index Rate as the Dependent Variable 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Never Released 0.192*** 0.157*** 0.166*** 0.164***  
 (0.000805) (0.000803) (0.000832) (0.000827)  
Unitary 0.172*** 0.145*** 0.149*** 0.147***  
 (0.000889) (0.000879) (0.000895) (0.000890)  
Poverty Rate 
(SAIPE) 
 0.197*** 0.192*** 0.217*** 0.217*** 
  (0.00154) (0.00172) (0.00176) (0.00176) 
Border Region   0.045*** 0.046*** 0.046*** 
   (0.000636) (0.000632) (0.000632) 
Northeast Region   -0.032*** -0.021*** -0.021*** 
   (0.000501) (0.000500) (0.000500) 
Midwest Region   0.062*** 0.071*** 0.071*** 
   (0.000469) (0.000468) (0.000468) 
West Region   0.028*** 0.032*** 0.032*** 
   (0.000513) (0.000511) (0.000511) 










N 145256 144094 144094 144094 144094 
R2 0.064 0.102 0.110 0.121 0.121 
Note. Standardized beta coefficients = * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 





Figure 3.5. Coefficients Representing Relationship between Information Theory Index and 
the Interaction between Desegregation Status and Year 
 
The Relationship between Unitary Status and Racial Composition over Time 
While the analyses examining changes in desegregation measures over time establish 
that districts under court order at the time of the Dowell ruling exhibit different patterns than 
those not under court order, they do not provide enough information to draw conclusions 
about the impact of unitary status on those segregation measures. In order to analyze the 
impact of unitary declarations on segregation indices, the number of years that pass after the 
courts terminate a segregation plan needs to be considered independent of calendar year. For 
example, in the year 2005, both Topeka, Kansas, and Oklahoma City would be considered 
“unitary districts.” However, Oklahoma City had already operated under unitary status for 14 
years, while Topeka had been operating under unitary status for only six years. In order to 
account for this conceptualization of time, the analysis uses the following regression equation: 
Yit = βX1i  + βX2it + βX3it +α+uit 
 
where Y represents the specific segregation measure being used as a dependent variable for i 
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have passed since the courts granted unitary status for i district, βX2it represents the poverty 
level, βX3it represents the region of the country. The symbol α represents the intercept, and u 
represents the error. Employing this regression model, analyses were conducted using all of 
the regression measures examined to contrast patterns across the subsets of districts. 
Dissimilarity Index 
Model 1 uses the black-white dissimilarity index and produced results that were 
significant at the p<0.001 level. The results Model 1 produced are included in both Figure 3.6 
and Table 3.8. 
 
 
Figure 3.6. Coefficients Reflecting Relationship between White-Black Dissimilarity Index 






























Results of Regression Equation Examining the Relationship between the Black-White 
Dissimilarity Index and the Number of Years Districts Operate under Unitary Status 
Variable Model 1 
0 years after release 0.000 (.) 
1 years after release 0.006 (0.0171) 
2 years after release 0.020 (0.0171) 
3 years after release 0.023 (0.0171) 
4 years after release 0.020 (0.0172) 
5 years after release 0.029 (0.0174) 
6 years after release 0.028 (0.0177) 
7 years after release 0.031 (0.0183) 
8 years after release 0.050* (0.0192) 
9 years after release 0.061** (0.0202) 
10 years after release 0.051* (0.0210) 
11 years after release 0.056** (0.0221) 
12 years after release 0.071*** (0.0241) 
13 years after release 0.058** (0.0250) 
14 years after release 0.072*** (0.0264) 
15 years after release 0.067*** (0.0280) 
16 years after release 0.091*** (0.0356) 
17 years after release 0.086*** (0.0403) 
18 years after release 0.075*** (0.0458) 
19 years after release 0.078*** (0.0546) 
20 years after release 0.052** (0.0735) 
21 years after release 0.043* (0.0866) 
22 years after release 0.046* (0.0967) 
Poverty Rate (SAIPE) 0.034 (0.0365) 











Note. Standardized beta coefficients = * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
Standard errors in parentheses 
 
As both Figure 3.6 and Table 3.8 indicate, the pattern demonstrated by this regression 
model is for the dissimilarity index to increase the longer districts operate under unitary 
status. This pattern differs significantly from the results produced by the regression equation 
using the white-black dissimilarity index as the dependent variable, but measuring the 
interaction between unitary status and calendar year. Specifically, this analysis considering 
the number of years a district operating under unitary status seems to more clearly connect 
unitary status to increases in the dissimilarity index, and indicates that this increase grows 
over the first two decades of unitary status. Some caution should be used in interpreting these 
results before year 8, as those individual coefficients were not statistically significant at the 
p<.05 level.  
Model 2 analyzes the relationship between white-Hispanic dissimilarity levels and the 
length of time districts operate under unitary status produces similar results that are included 
in Figure 3.7 and Table 3.9. In this case, the dissimilarity levels between white and Hispanic 
students steadily increase at statistically significant levels from year 2 through year 15 before 
tapering somewhat during the last seven years of the model. Again, this pattern is different 
than the one demonstrated when considering the relationship between white-Hispanic 
dissimilarity and the interaction of unitary status and calendar year. This analysis also 
Variable Model 1 
Northeast Region 0.016 (0.0262) 
Midwest Region 0.048* (0.0102) 





suggests that districts are likely to see increasing segregation between white and Hispanic 
students the longer they operated under unitary status.  
 
 
Figure 3.7. Coefficients Reflecting Relationship between White-Hispanic Dissimilarity Index 
and Years Operating under Unitary Status 
Table 3.9 
Model 2 Results of Regression Equation Using White-Hispanic Dissimilarity Level and Years 
Operating under Unitary Status 
 Model 2 
1 year after release 0.038 (0.0133) 
2 years after release 0.058* (0.0134) 
3 years after release 0.094*** (0.0135) 
4 years after release 0.111*** (0.0136) 
5 years after release 0.110*** (0.0139) 
6 years after release 0.134*** (0.0142) 
7 years after release 0.161*** (0.0147) 
8 years after release 0.162*** (0.0155) 
9 years after release 0.155*** (0.0162) 
10 years after release 0.153*** (0.0170) 



























 Model 2 
12 years after release 0.158*** (0.0195) 
13 years after release 0.173*** (0.0204) 
14 years after release 0.172*** (0.0215) 
15 years after release 0.182*** (0.0228) 
16 years after release 0.155*** (0.0280) 
17 years after release 0.156*** (0.0317) 
18 years after release 0.132*** (0.0358) 
19 years after release 0.150*** (0.0425) 
20 years after release 0.124*** (0.0569) 
21 years after release 0.084*** (0.0671) 
22 years after release 0.098*** (0.0750) 
Poverty Rate (SAIPE) 0.148*** (0.0291) 
Border Region -0.057** (0.0109) 
Northeast Region 0.039* (0.0202) 
Midwest Region -0.133*** (0.00811) 
West Region 0.147*** (0.0171) 
Observations 2854 
R2 0.209 
Note. Standardized beta coefficients = * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
Standard errors in parentheses 
 
Exposure Index 
Model 4 examines the association between the black-white exposure index and the 
number of years a district operates under court order. The results of Model 4 are exhibited in 
Figure 3.8 and Table 3.10. In this model, the exposure rates between black and white students 
drop for the first 11 years of the model before rebounding to nearly their original level. This 
result is different from those for the regression looking at the much more stable, flat 





Figure 3.8. Coefficients Reflecting Relationship between Black-White Exposure Index and 




Results of Model 4 Regression Equation Analyzing Black-White Exposure Index and Number 
of Years Operation under Unitary Status  
 Model 4 
1 Year After Release -0.014*** (0.00348) 
2 Years After Release -0.033*** (0.00345) 
3 Years After Release -0.052*** (0.00343) 
4 Years After Release -0.071*** (0.00344) 
5 Years After Release -0.087*** (0.00348) 
6 Years After Release -0.101*** (0.00350) 
7 Years After Release -0.107*** (0.00356) 
8 Years After Release -0.124*** (0.00365) 
9 Years After Release -0.133*** (0.00373) 
10 Years After Release -0.146*** (0.00381) 
11 Years After Release -0.153*** (0.00389) 


























(All years statistically significant at the p<0.001 level)
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 Model 4 
13 Years After Release -0.100*** (0.00436) 
14 Years After Release -0.125*** (0.00451) 
15 Years After Release -0.131*** (0.00469) 
16 Years After Release -0.133*** (0.00518) 
17 Years After Release -0.126*** (0.00554) 
18 Years After Release -0.088*** (0.00640) 
19 Years After Release -0.090*** (0.00714) 
20 Years After Release -0.024*** (0.0110) 
21 Years After Release -0.019*** (0.0125) 
22 Years After Release -0.029*** (0.0141) 
Poverty Rate (SAIPE) -0.507*** (0.00818) 
Border Region -0.077*** (0.00199) 
Northeast Region 0.070*** (0.00453) 
Midwest Region 0.147*** (0.00199) 
West Region 0.046*** (0.00234) 
N 104483 
R2 0.298 
Note. Standardized beta coefficients = * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
Standard errors in parentheses 
 
Model 5 conducts a similar analysis using the Hispanic-White exposure rate as the 
dependent variable. This model produced results that were statistically significant at the 




Figure 3.9. Coefficients Reflecting Relationship between Hispanic-White Exposure Index and 
Years Operating under Unitary Status 
Model 5 produces a pattern that differs from the model considering the relationship 
between unitary status and calendar year on the Hispanic-white exposure index. While that 
model produced results that were stable and relatively flat, this model demonstrates a steady 
increase in the exposure of Hispanic students to white students for the first 11 years of the 
model, followed by a steady decline from years 11 to 18, then an erratic series of changes the 
final five years of the panel. Caution should be used in interpreting the results of the first four 






























Results of Model 5 Regression Equation Analyzing Black-White Exposure Index and Number 
of Years Operation under Unitary Status 
 Model 5 
1 Year After Release 0.014 (0.0154) 
2 Years After Release 0.019 (0.0154) 
3 Years After Release 0.029 (0.0156) 
4 Years After Release 0.039 (0.0156) 
5 Years After Release 0.047* (0.0160) 
6 Years After Release 0.057* (0.0164) 
7 Years After Release 0.050* (0.0170) 
8 Years After Release 0.069** (0.0178) 
9 Years After Release 0.071*** (0.0187) 
10 Years After Release 0.083*** (0.0196) 
11 Years After Release 0.089*** (0.0206) 
12 Years After Release 0.087*** (0.0224) 
13 Years After Release 0.087*** (0.0235) 
14 Years After Release 0.081*** (0.0248) 
15 Years After Release 0.074*** (0.0263) 
16 Years After Release 0.066*** (0.0323) 
17 Years After Release 0.056** (0.0365) 
18 Years After Release 0.043* (0.0412) 
19 Years After Release 0.057*** (0.0490) 
20 Years After Release 0.039* (0.0656) 
21 Years After Release 0.053** (0.0774) 
22 Years After Release 0.030 (0.0864) 
Poverty Rate (SAIPE) 0.282*** (0.0335) 
Border Region 0.101*** (0.0125) 
Northeast Region 0.124*** (0.0233) 
Midwest Region 0.010 (0.00934) 
West Region 0.344*** (0.0197) 
N 2858 
R2 0.245 
Note. Standardized beta coefficients = * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 





Model 6 is the final model that examines the relationship between a segregation 
measure and unitary status and focuses on the information theory index. Once again, the 
regression equation produces results that are statistically significant at the p<0.001 level, and 
these results are included in Figure 3.10 and Table 3.12. These results again reflect a different 
pattern than the one produced when unitary status interacts with calendar year. In this case, 
the information theory drops steadily for the first 12 years districts operate under unitary 
status before rebounding steadily between years 12 and 18, before demonstrating an uneven 
rebound in the final five years examined. Overall, the information theory level is lower after 
22 years of unitary status even after the significant rebound. 
 
Figure 3.10. Coefficients Reflecting Relationship between Information Theory Index and 
Years Operating under Unitary Status 
 
The results from this regression using a multi-group segregation index would suggest 
that the contrasting findings from the models examining the dissimilarity and exposure 
indices would seem to suggest that those differences are due to redistribution of students in 



























segregation decreases during the period examined. Instead, these results suggest that there is a 
statistically significant relationship between segregation and unitary status, indicating that 
overall, segregation increases the longer unitary status is in place.  
Table 3.12 
Results of Model 6 Regression Equation Analyzing Black-White Exposure Index and Number 
of Years Operation under Unitary Status 
 
 Model 6 
1 year after release -0.005 (0.0158) 
2 years after release -0.014 (0.0159) 
3 years after release -0.030 (0.0159) 
4 years after release -0.039 (0.0160) 
5 years after release -0.043 (0.0164) 
6 years after release -0.058* (0.0168) 
7 years after release -0.054* (0.0174) 
8 years after release -0.064** (0.0183) 
9 years after release -0.067** (0.0192) 
10 years after release -0.081*** (0.0200) 
11 years after release -0.087*** (0.0211) 
12 years after release -0.095*** (0.0229) 
13 years after release -0.085*** (0.0240) 
14 years after release -0.080*** (0.0254) 
15 years after release -0.073*** (0.0269) 
16 years after release -0.065*** (0.0330) 
17 years after release -0.055** (0.0373) 
18 years after release -0.042* (0.0421) 
19 years after release -0.056** (0.0501) 
20 years after release -0.038* (0.0671) 
21 years after release -0.052** (0.0791) 
22 years after release -0.029 (0.0884) 
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 Model 6 
Poverty Rate (SAIPE) -0.288*** (0.0343) 
Border Region  -0.095*** (0.0128) 
Northeast Region -0.118*** (0.0238) 
Midwest Region -0.004 (0.00956) 
West Region -0.335*** (0.0201) 
N 2853 
R2 0.240 
Note. Standardized beta coefficients = * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
Standard errors in parentheses 
 
Discussion 
The results of these analyses provide clear evidence to help answer the research 
questions framing this chapter. 1Simple summaries of racial composition between 1993 and 
2013 indicate that racial composition of school districts have changed regardless of their 
association with legal segregation in the past. However, the analyses in this chapter find that 
regardless of the desegregation metric included, every model produced statistically significant 
results that demonstrated that districts under court order at the time of the Dowell ruling had 
substantially different patterns of segregation from 1993 through 2013. These differences 
persisted in both binary and multi-group measures of segregation and affected both black and 
Hispanic students. While the racial composition of all districts changed regardless of their 
experiences with legal segregation, this does not explain the differences in segregation levels 
for each subset of district.  
                                                          
1 In addition to the analyses conducted in this chapter, the relationship between desegregation metrics and 
unitary status was examined using multi-level, mixed effects regression models that incorporates a fixed effects 
approach examining the impact of unitary status over time and a random effects approach that captures the 
effects of the various regions, judicial circuits, and states where these unitary districts are located.  These 
preliminary results validate and reinforce the findings in this chapter, and will be integrated into future research 
on the topic. 
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In addition to finding both overall changes in racial composition and differing patterns 
of segregation across the subsets of districts analyzed, this chapter demonstrates that there is a 
relationship between granting unitary status and the impact of this status and increasing 
segregation levels over time. These analyses validate the findings of Reardon et al., Lutz, 
Clotfelter, Vigdor, and Ladd and others that progress towards integration slows and ultimately 
reverses once court-ordered desegregation plans are terminated, and that this reversal is more 
than just chance or the result of the larger demographic shifts in the country’s public schools. 
School districts argue that further integration is difficult when making the case that the courts 
should terminate court orders. However, the value of these court-mandated desegregation 
plans may lie in their ability to consolidate gains towards integration and prevent 
resegregation. Given the limited number of tools that districts have to voluntarily work 
towards integration, the value of court-ordered desegregation plans to provide a bulwark 
against resegregation seems to justify the courts’ continuation of these plans into the near 
future. However, given the broader political and judicial shift away from progressive race-
based enrollment policies, this objective evidence of the value of court-ordered desegregation 
plans may prove insufficient to protect them from future legal challenges from districts and 





SCHOOL FINANCE AFTER DOWELL 
Introduction 
This chapter examines the critical intersection of desegregation and school finance 
policy in districts implementing court-ordered desegregation plans from 1993 to 2013. 
Desegregation and education finance are two of the most critical areas of education policy 
over the past 60 years. Both the desegregation movement and education finance litigation 
have had an enormous impact on the collective conception of educational equity in the United 
States and have generated significant amounts of education research. Despite the frequent 
intersection of these two policy issues, little recent research has examined the impact of the 
end of segregation on school finance. 
While the Brown decision noted that racially segregated schools were inherently 
unequal, both desegregation cases and education finance litigation has pointed to a myriad of 
examples where racial isolation in schools and school districts correlates with significant 
inequities in availability of resources. Many equity advocates saw school finance litigation in 
state courts as a complement to federal desegregation litigation. Indeed, as desegregation 
litigation first stalled and then reversed course in federal courts, equity advocates saw finance 
cases as the best route to obtaining judicial remedies to the consequences of racial isolation in 
public schools. 
There is some debate about the amount or use of fiscal resources needed to close the 
black-white achievement gap, but researchers have largely indicated a consensus belief in the 
concept of vertical equity. Economists and scholars of school finance have spent a 
considerable amount of time attempting to determine the amount of resources necessary to 
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ensure that all students meet standard educational outcomes regardless of individual or 
school-level characteristics that may make it more difficult to meet established benchmarks. 
Research on the relationship between race, educational outcomes, and related resources 
proves to be especially important when considering post-unitary districts. Bifulco (2005), 
Green, Baker, and Oluwole (2008), and others have pointed to the increased costs associated 
with educating minority students. At the same time, many post-unitary districts find they must 
contend with high concentrations of students with disabilities, students who do not speak 
English, and students who come from impoverished backgrounds (Orfield & Lee, 2007). Each 
of these challenges requires not only additional efforts on the part of educators, but also 
additional fiscal efforts to ensure an adequate education.  
A considerable number of urban school districts in the United States, including 
Chicago, Los Angeles, and Philadelphia, are among those that remained under court-ordered 
desegregation plans at the time of the Dowell ruling. Despite the overwhelming evidence that 
many such districts experienced intense racial isolation entering the 1990s, the courts declared 
San Diego, Little Rock, and Cleveland, among others, unitary during the same period. An 
examination of changes in spending patterns in post-unitary districts may help researchers and 
urban education advocates to better understand the fiscal impact of unitary status on these 
large urban systems. 
Despite these connections between desegregation and school finance, scholars and 
policy makers have conducted little research to examine changes in district finances after the 
end of court-ordered desegregation. Green and Baker (2006) have examined some of the 
conventional wisdom about funding in Kansas City, Missouri, during the latter years of court-
ordered desegregation. Additionally, the Civil Rights Project (Orfield & Lee, 2007) has noted 
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the growing disparities between districts serving minority students and those serving 
predominately white students. These studies, however, are notable exceptions to a general 
lack of investigation regarding school finances in districts under court order at the time of the 
Dowell ruling. 
Research Questions 
 Due to the lack of studies that focus on a comprehensive examination of school 
finance data in post-unitary districts, this chapter focuses on three basic research questions. 
They are: 
1. Do school finance data for post-unitary districts indicate any change in revenue or 
spending patterns during the post-Dowell era? 
2. Do any changes in spending patterns among post-unitary districts indicate an 
increase or decrease of fiscal support for schools during this period? 
3. Did fiscal patterns change once court granted districts unitary status? 
These questions provide an initial step into a deeper exploration of the intersection of 
desegregation plans and school funding strategies since the Dowell ruling. Admittedly, the 
answers to these questions will not provide a complete picture of how school funding and the 
termination of court orders interacted in school districts still under court supervision at the 
time of the Dowell decision.  
At the same time, these initial findings should be able to steer further analyses of 
school finance data in post-unitary districts and rule out certain hypotheses. Specifically, if 
overall trends indicate that post-unitary districts decreased spending after the termination of 
court plans, it would suggest that school districts might have cut funding as a response to 
being released from court-ordered funding. An increase in spending during the post-unitary 
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period provides impetus for researchers to ask questions about whether school districts 
increased funding as the result of courts declaring unitary status, and if districts leverage 
additional funds to respond to the termination of a court-ordered desegregation plan. 
Regardless of whether spending increased or decreased, any shift in spending could prompt 
further examinations of the potential relationship and impact of these changes in spending on 
student achievement in post-unitary district.  
Methodology 
This study uses a 21-year panel of district-level data from 1993 through school year 
2013 and includes data on 481 school districts where court-ordered desegregation rulings 
were in effect at the time of the Supreme Court’s Dowell decision. A detailed description of 
the dataset is available in Chapter 1. 
Fiscal data used in these analyses were obtained from the NCES Common Core of 
Data F-33 Local Education Agency Finance Surveys from 1990 through 2005 (National 
Center for Education Statistics, 2016) and from the Rutgers Graduate School of 
Education/Education Law Center: School Funding Fairness Data System (Baker, Srikanth, & 
Weber, 2016). When absolute expenditures or revenues are discussed, these figures were 
adjusted for inflation using the Consumer Wage Index (CWI). In the National Center for 
Education Statistics Guide regarding the use of CWIs, Taylor and Glander (2006) note: 
The Comparable Wage Index (CWI) is a measure of the systematic, regional 
variations in the salaries of college graduates who are not educators. It can be used by 
researchers to adjust district-level finance data at different levels in order to make 




The CWI accounts for both regional differences in costs as well as inflation over time. Where 
district to labor market comparisons are made, the labor markets used are those defined by the 
CWI index. 
To analyze differences across the three subsets of school districts included in this dissertation, 
a series of multiple regressions was conducted to contrast the results produced by the different 
districts. The specification for this multiple regression is: 
Yit = α+(DESEGit * YEARi) + βPOVERTYit + RELSPENDit + REGIONit +α+it+it 
 
Y represents the respective fiscal variable being analyzed (either overall spending, 
administrative spending, or revenue generated from local sources) for district i in year t.  The 
fiscal variable is the dependent variable in all of these initial models. The independent 
variables include DESEG which represents the district desegregation status in a given period 
and YEAR represents the calendar year for that period. POVERTY captures the poverty rate, 
and RELSPEND reflects the district to labor market spending ratio, and REGION reflects 
region of the country.  represents the between district error and  represents the standard 
error. All calculations for these regressions comparing subsets of districts are reported using 
standardized coefficients and also report standard errors.  
To further analyze the association between a declaration of unitary status and its 
potential association with the fiscal variables being analyzed in this chapter, several of the 
analyses employ a fixed-effects regression model. Employing this approach controls allows 
for examination of several time-varying predictors, and also controls for time-invariant 
characteristics of unitary districts that might introduce bias into the equations (Greene 2002; 
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Dranove, 2012;). The equations for these fixed-effects models include only independent 
variables that are time-sensitive, and are specified as: 
Yit=POSTORDit+POVERTYit+RELSPENDit+it+
In this fixed-effects equation, Y is the respective fiscal variable being analyzed (either 
overall spending, administrative spending, or revenue generated from local sources). 
POSTORD refers to the number of year a district has operated under unitary status; POVERTY 
captures the poverty rate for that district in that year of unitary status; and RELSPEND is a 
vector of the relative spending between district i and the average spending for that district’s 
respective labor market. Individual fixed effects are represented by and therefore control 
for all time-insensitive characteristics and is the standard error term2. All 215 unitary 
districts were included in these models, with each district featuring a different number of 
observations based on how many years it operated under unitary status. Altogether, the fixed 
effects models in this chapter include 2,868 observations. All calculations are reported as 
standardized coefficients, and they also report standard errors.  
Findings 
Per-Pupil Spending 
Figure 4.1 illustrates the mean per-pupil expenditure for each of the subsets of districts 
between 1993 and 2013. The graph shows that school districts not under court supervision at 
the time of the Dowell ruling had a higher mean per-pupil expenditure in 1993 and maintained 
                                                          
2 Fixed-effects regressions were calculated in STATA, which creates dummy variables for all observations with 
one omitted, and also dummy variables for each of the years operating under unitary status (1-22).  STATA then 
uses these dummy variables to calculate the fixed effects regression. (Torres-Reyna, 2007).  
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a higher per-pupil expenditure than either districts that remained under court order or unitary 
districts in each year of the dataset.  
 
Figure 4.1. Mean Expenditures per Pupil, 1993-2013 
 
To account for differences in education costs across various regions of the country, 
Figure 4.2 captures the ratio of a district’s spending compared to the spending for the 
district’s entire labor market. Figure 4.2 shows that both districts consistently under court 
order and unitary districts spent slightly more compared to their labor markets, while districts 
not under court order spent just under the average for their labor markets. Between 1993 and 
2013, districts consistently under court-ordered desegregation on average spent 1 to 3% more 
than the average for their labor markets. Both the actual spending figures as well as the 
evidence of relatives spending seems to largely contradict the public narrative that 
desegregation districts spent markedly higher amounts of money compared to surrounding 









































Figure 4.2. Ratios of District to Labor Market Spending, 1993-2013 
 
Further evidence that contradicts the perception that districts under court-ordered 
supervision spend significantly more per pupil is also evidenced when analyzing spending by 
districts once they are released from court order. Table 4.1 shows the ratio of district to labor 
market spending for districts after the courts terminate districts’ desegregation plans. The ratio 
never drops, and indeed shows an increase in some years, notable after 15 years of release 
from court oversight. These data suggests that court-ordered desegregation plans do not seem 
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 Districts under a court order also seem to see a rise in relative spending from 2009 
through 2012, years when the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) provided 
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school districts funding for both operating and capital expenditures in the hopes of offsetting 
the consequences of the Great Recession. Further analysis of the relationship between 
desegregation status and ARRA funding follows later in this chapter.  
Regression Results 
 
While these descriptive statistics provide some insight into the spending patterns of 
different subsets of school districts included in the dataset, further analysis is required to 
determine if these patterns are statistically significant. To examine this statistical significance, 
I fitted various models that treated per-pupil expenditures as the dependent variable, the 
desegregation status as the independent variable, and a variety of explanatory variables. Table 
4.2 reports the standardized beta coefficients and standard errors from these regression 
models.  
Model 1 shows that districts never released from court order and unitary districts have 
statistically significant, negative relationships with per-pupil spending compared to districts 
not under court order. Model 2 adds the poverty level of each district into the equation. 
Poverty level demonstrates a negative, statistically significant relationship with spending, and 
the inclusion of poverty level in the regression equation blunts the negative impact of 
desegregation status on spending to a small extent. Model 3 adds the ratio of district to labor 
market spending into the regression. Relative spending has a strong, positive, statistically 
significant relationship with per-pupil spending. In all three of these models, the overall 
explanation of variance represented by the r-squared value is small.  
Model 4 adds another explanatory variable to the equation by fitting the various 
regions of the country into the equation as a dummy variable, and using the Southern region 
as the base. Given that per-pupil expenditures have already been adjusted using the CWI, 
 
83 
these regional differences reflect variations beyond labor costs across different geographic 
areas. The strength of this association is not statistically significant for the Border region, 
statistically significant but small for the Midwestern and Western regions, and significant and 
substantial for the Northeastern region. Additionally, introducing regional variance “flips” the 
association between desegregation status and spending from negative to positive and weakens 
the statistical significance of these associations. Model 4 also explains much more of the 




Stepwise Regression Models on Per Pupil Spending, Models 1 through 6 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
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Year     Individual 
Coefficients included 
in Figure 4.4 
 
N 152481 151403 151403 151403 151403 151403 
R2 0.003 0.015 0.102 0.248 0.725 0.725 
Note. Standardized beta coefficients = * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
Standard errors in parentheses 
 
The final two models add time as a variable to the regression equation. Model 5 adds 
calendar year to the model as a categorical variable. The regression results show a strong, 
statistically significant relationship between spending and time that increases over time, 
illustrated in Figure 4.3. There are also slight increases in the associations between regions 
and spending. Finally, adding time into the model increases the negative association between  
 
Figure 4.3. Coefficients for Individual Years from Regression Model 5 
 
poverty rate and spending. Overall, this model predicts .703 of the variance in spending. The 
coefficients for each individual year of the model are documented in Figure 4.4. 
Model 6 takes a somewhat different approach to the inclusion of time in the regression 
equation by looking at the interaction of desegregation status and each individual year in the 






































Figure 4.4. Coefficients for Interactions between Desegregation Status and Year 
 
By looking at these interactions rather than time as a single continuous variable for the 
entire dataset, we see that the relationship between spending and time varies significantly 
between districts that are not under court order and districts that had a desegregation order in 
place at the time of the Dowell ruling. The strength of the association between an individual 
year and spending increases much more significantly over time for districts not under court 
order compared to districts that were under court oversight in 1991. For districts with no court 
order, the coefficients for each individual year correspond with the increases predicted when 
time is used as a continuous variable. 
 However, both subsets of districts that did have a court order in place in 1990 saw a 
very different pattern, with much smaller increases in the coefficients from year to year and 
years where the coefficients remain flat or even demonstrate small declines. These differing 
patterns become most evident in the final year of the dataset, where districts not under court 
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order report a coefficient of .085, and unitary districts report a coefficient of .063. These 
findings indicate that districts operating under court-ordered desegregation plans at the time 
of the Supreme Court’s ruling in the Dowell case experienced much more muted increases in 
per pupil spending compared to districts not impacted by the court order. 
The results of Model 7, which is the Model using the fixed-effects regression 
described in the methodology section, are included in Table 4.3. These results demonstrate 
that release from court order has a slightly negative relationship with per-pupil spending. 
These relationships are statistically significant 15 of the 22 years reported in Model 7. Table 
4.3 and Figure 4.5 present the results of Model 7.  
Table 4.3 
Results of Regression for Model 7 
Independent Variable Standardized beta coefficient (per 
pupil expenditure)  
Standard Error 
1 year after release 0.039*** (22.01) 
2 years after release 0.076*** (34.41) 
3 years after release 0.110*** (45.63) 
4 years after release 0.142*** (58.27) 
5 years after release 0.170*** (73.52) 
6 years after release 0.191*** (83.33) 
7 years after release 0.214*** (291.5) 
8 years after release 0.229*** (305.0) 
9 years after release 0.243*** (22.01) 
10 years after release 0.255*** (34.41) 
11 years after release 0.268*** (45.63) 
12 years after release 0.252*** (58.27) 
13 years after release 0.255*** (73.52) 
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Independent Variable Standardized beta coefficient (per 
pupil expenditure)  
Standard Error 
14 years after release 0.244*** (83.33) 
15 years after release 0.247*** (89.72) 
16 years after release 0.215*** (94.17) 
17 years after release 0.205*** (108.8) 
18 years after release 0.180*** (120.5) 
19 years after release 0.153*** (137.2) 
20 years after release 0.109*** (143.0) 
21 years after release 0.092*** (158.6) 




Relative Spending (District to  
Labor Market) 
0.487*** (255.1) 
N 2868  
R-Squared 0.778  
Note. Standardized beta coefficients = * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 




Figure 4.5. Model 7 Examining Relationship between Expenditures per Pupil and Time 
Elapsed from Termination of Desegregation Order 
 
While the strength of this association is relatively insignificant compared to the other 
coefficients in the model, this finding provides statistically significant evidence that unitary 
districts had distinctly different spending patterns than either districts that were not under 
court order at the time of the Dowell ruling or districts that were never released from court 
order between 1993 and 2013.  
Administrative Spending 
In addition to overall per-pupil spending, this chapter also examined the relationship 
between administrative spending and desegregation status. Examining this association is 
important because plaintiffs often cite burdensome administrative costs associated with a 
district’s compliance with a court-ordered desegregation plans when suing for unitary status 
(Orfield & Thronson, 1993; Ryan, 1999). Interestingly, school districts themselves do not 
support pursuing unitary status, and complain that the cost exceeds potential savings from 
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between general administrative spending and desegregation status, this analysis seeks to 
validate these claims. 
To examine the statistical relationship between administrative spending and 
desegregation status, I constructed a series of regression models that used percentage of 
spending focused on administration as the dependent variable and desegregation status as the 
independent variable. Table 4.4reports the standardized beta coefficients and standard errors 
from these regression models.  
The regressions in Models 1 through 5 showed that both districts under court order 
and unitary districts have a statistically significant, negative relationship with administrative 
spending when controlling for the other variables in the model. The negative relationships are 
relatively consistent across all models, and suggest that districts not under court order are 
likely to have higher general administrative costs than districts under court order.  
 Model 6 seems to indicate that the continued presence of a court order may increase 
general administrative spending over time. This model looked at the interaction between 
desegregation status and calendar year and the association of this interaction with changes in 
administrative spending. While districts that were not under court order and unitary districts 
showed slight, gradual increases in the standardized beta coefficients for these regressions 
over the 21-year panel, districts never released from court order saw more significant 
increases from 1997 through 2013, resulting in a coefficient that suggests a much greater 
increase in general administrative spending compared to the other two subsets of school 






Relationship between General Administrative Spending and Desegregation Status 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
 General Administrative Spending Per Pupil 
(Standard Error) 
Active#Year      See Figure 4.6 














































































Calendar Year     0.305*** 
(0.052) 
 
R2 Value 0.004 0.004 0.074 0.206 0.298 0.3 
Note. Standardized beta coefficients = * p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001 





Figure 4.6. Regression Results Examining General Administrative Spending, Desegregation 
Status, and Year 
 
Given the specific focus on administrative spending associated with compliance, and 
plaintiffs’ arguments that terminating a court order would reduce these costs, I constructed a 
model that looks specifically at administrative spending in unitary districts. This model, 
Model 7, is a fixed-effects multiple regression.  Model 7 indicates that unitary districts never 
realize a savings in general administrative spending after the courts terminate their 
desegregation plans. Instead, districts see a surge in general administrative spending for the 
first decade after desegregation plans end, and then gradually retreating, though to a level that 
is still nominally above the initial level of administrative spending at the time courts declared 
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Results of Regression Examining Administrative Spending and Elapsed Time from Unitary 
Declaration 
 
Independent Variable Standardized Beta Coefficient Standard Error 
1 year after release 0.019** (2.526) 
2 years after release 0.027*** (3.024) 
3 years after release 0.055*** (4.248) 
4 years after release 0.057*** (4.070) 
5 years after release 0.063*** (4.531) 
6 years after release 0.094*** (6.006) 
7 years after release 0.093*** (5.491) 
8 years after release 0.106*** (5.974) 
9 years after release 0.119*** (8.117) 
10 years after release 0.130*** (10.53) 
11 years after release 0.117*** (9.811) 
12 years after release 0.115*** (12.43) 
13 years after release 0.107*** (10.73) 
14 years after release 0.103*** (11.75) 
15 years after release 0.106*** (16.29) 
16 years after release 0.080*** (12.02) 
17 years after release 0.082*** (14.75) 
18 years after release 0.074*** (19.00) 
19 years after release 0.063*** (18.78) 
20 years after release 0.054*** (28.28) 
21 years after release 0.033** (32.59) 
22 Years After Release 0.033*** (25.64) 
Poverty Level (SAIPE) -0.078 (58.23) 
Relative Spending (District to Labor Market) 0.274*** (47.67) 
N 2868  
R2 0.204  





Figure 4.7. Change in Standardized Beta Coefficient Reflecting Relationship between 
General Administrative Spending and Years after Declaration of Unitary Status 
 
These findings contradict plaintiffs’ arguments that ending court-ordered 
desegregation plans would lower administrative costs for school districts. Administrative 
costs rise in statistically significant ways for both districts that remain under court order and 
unitary districts.  
Local Tax Effort 
While an examination of expenditure data has produced findings that help answer the 
research questions related to the fiscal patterns, some examination of revenue generation is 
needed to explore changes in fiscal support for districts after the courts release districts from 
desegregation plans. Again, we use regression equations like the other analysis in this chapter, 
this time using the percentage of revenue derived from local sources as the dependent 
variable. In the regression equations examining districts’ fiscal commitments, the percent of 
revenue generated from local sources serves as the dependent variable as a proxy for a 
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status as the sole, categorical independent variable in Model 1, and then adds the same 
explanatory variables as our other regression models (poverty rate, relative revenue 
generation, region, time, and the interaction of desegregation status and calendar year) in 
Models 2 through 6. Table 4.6 and Figure 4.8 display the results of the regression models and 
the interaction between desegregation status and calendar year. 
Table 4.6 
Results of Regression Models Examining Percentage of Revenue Generated from Local 
Sources 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
 Pct. of revenue generated from local sources 
(standardized beta coefficient) 

































































































N 152863 151643 151643 151643 151643 151643 
R2 Value 0.010 0.314 0.369 0.415 0.417 0.434 
Note. Standardized beta coefficients = * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 




Figure 4.8. Interaction of Percentage of Revenue from Local Sources, Desegregation Status, 
and Time 
 
The overall trends in Model 6 show minimal fluctuation in the association between 
desegregation status and the revenue generated from local sources for both districts under 
court order and unitary districts. However, districts not under court order show more 
fluctuation, with a significant dip throughout the 1990s, and then a mostly steady climb in the 
association from 2000 through 2012. For example, districts not under court order see the 
coefficient representing the relationship between desegregation status and local funding drop 
from -.018 in 1994 to -.077 in 2000, reflecting a substantial decline in these districts’ reliance 
on local funding during this period. Over the same period, districts never released from court 
order show minimal change from -.006 in 1994 to -.012 in 2000, reflecting a steady reliance 
on local funding. Unitary districts move from -.003 in 1994 to -.01 in 2000, also reflecting 
essentially a steady reliance on local funding. This flat trend for districts with court order in 
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not under court order see the coefficients climb throughout the 2000s and cross back into 
positive territory in 2011. These regressions seem to suggest that neither a court-ordered 
desegregation plan nor a declaration of unitary status seems to be correlated with significant 
shifts in local revenue generation.  
I also conducted a fixed-effect, multiple regression analysis focusing specifically on 
the relationship between the percentage of revenue derived from local sources and the length 
of time that unitary districts had been released from their court-ordered desegregation plans 
(Model 7). The equation for Model 7 is describe in the methodology section of this chapter, 
and the results are presented in Table 4.7 and Figure 4.9. 
Table 4.7 
Regression Model Examining Relationship between Percentage of Local Revenue and Years 
of Release from Court Order 
 Model 1  
 Pct. revenue from local sources Standard Error 
1 Year After Release 0.004 (0.254) 
2 Years After Release 0.011 (0.312) 
3 Years After Release 0.017** (0.311) 
4 Years After Release 0.012 (0.414) 
5 Years After Release 0.034*** (0.421) 
6 Years After Release 0.042*** (0.444) 
7 Years After Release 0.045*** (0.533) 
8 Years After Release 0.032*** (0.582) 
9 Years After Release 0.040*** (0.607) 
10 Years After Release 0.039*** (0.680) 
11 Years After Release 0.030** (0.840) 
12 Years After Release -0.002 (0.995) 
13 Years After Release -0.009 (1.120) 
14 Years After Release -0.010 (1.262) 
 
97 
 Model 1  
 Pct. revenue from local sources Standard Error 
15 Years After Release -0.008 (1.509) 
16 Years After Release 0.017 (1.260) 
17 Years After Release 0.013 (1.357) 
18 Years After Release 0.009 (1.403) 
19 Years After Release 0.011 (1.924) 
20 Years After Release 0.016** (1.512) 
21 Years After Release 0.013*** (1.323) 
22 Years After Release 0.012* (1.764) 
Poverty Rate (SAIPE) -0.153*** (5.723) 
Relative Revenue 0.047 (3.267) 
N 2868  
R2 0.078  




Figure 4.9. Change in Standardized Beta Coefficient Reflecting Relationship between 
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While this analysis had somewhat limited value because several individual years did 
not produce statistically significant results, there is a clear pattern demonstrated from the fifth 
year after the termination of a court order through the 12th year after termination of a court 
order. During this period, unitary districts demonstrate a statistically significant, positive 
correlation between the release from court order and the percentage of their revenue generated 
locally when controlling for other variables including poverty level, relative revenue 
generation, the region of the country, and the calendar year. This pattern suggests that unitary 
districts shouldered more of the burden for funding schools locally after courts terminated 
desegregation plans. This finding is also notable considering the 1990 Missouri v Jenkins 
ruling. In that case, the Supreme Court ruled that courts could set local tax rates to fund 
efforts to end desegregation. While desegregation opponents often found this to be one of the 
most onerous burdens of mandatory desegregation plans, it appears that districts increased the 
share of revenue generated locally after decisions about taxation rates returned entirely to 
local control. 
ARRA Funds 
As the overall trends for expenditures and revenues indicate, the gap between districts 
not under court order at the time of the Dowell ruling and districts that were under court order 
were magnified from 2008 and beyond. This shift is likely to due to the impact of both the 
Great Recession of 2008 as well as the federal funds invested in education through the 
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA). The previous analyses demonstrate how 
the gaps in relative revenue generation and spending shifted after the Great Recession, but 




The National Center for Education Statistics finance data include three specific 
variables related to ARRA funding for fiscal years 2009 through 2012. These three variables 
note that amount of Title I revenue a district received through ARRA, the amount of overall 
expenditures funded by ARRA, and the amount of capital outlay funded by ARRA. Figure 
4.10 summarizes the ARRA investments in the various categories of districts in 2009 through 
2012.  
The ARRA descriptive data indicate that there was a lag in ARRA funding, with 
districts not under court order receiving more significant amounts of funding during FY2009. 
The rate of funding for all categories of districts increased substantially in 2010 and 2011. 
Districts under court order exhibited overall expenditures 6% higher than districts not under 
court order, and with capital outlay expenditures 17% higher than districts not under court 
order. The federal government allocated nearly twice as much Title I ARRA revenue to 



















































































































































2009 6,700 $ 108 $1 $3 267 $40 $1 $2 215 $40 $2 $6 
2010 6,693 $ 339 $ 21 $46 268 $ 396 $44 $105 215 $439 $35 $120 
2011 6,672 $342 $ 21  $46 268 $ 401 $45 $ 106 215 $ 443 $ 35 $ 121 
2012 6,654 $76 $ 7 $ 12 267 $ 102 $ 17 $ 29 215 $ 111 $ 22 $ 48 
Figure 4.10. Summary of ARRA Investments, 2009 through 2012 
districts under court order compared to districts not under court order, with the relative level 
dropping somewhat in 2012. Unitary districts had higher comparable levels of ARRA 
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revenues; spending 17% more total ARRA than districts not under court order, and with twice 
the amount of capital outlay expenditures. Unitary districts received approximately 225% of 
the Title I ARRA funding that districts not under court order received.  
To test the statistical significance of the relationship between ARRA funding and a 
district’s desegregation status, I conducted a linear regression like those conducted for the 
other analyses. The regressions used the three ARRA variables (overall expenditures, capital 
outlay expenditures, and Title I ARRA revenue) as the dependent variable, desegregation 
status and calendar year as an interaction as the independent variable, and poverty level, 
relative spending, and region of the country as explanatory variables. The equation for these 
regression models is: 
Yit = α+(DESEGit * YEARi) + βPOVERTYit + RELSPENDit + REGIONit +α+it+it 
In each of these equations, Y represents the dependent variable, which is the respective 
ARRA funding variable (Overall Expenditures, Capital Expenditures, or Title I revenue). The 
independent variables include DESEG which represents the district desegregation status in a 
given period and YEAR represents the calendar year for that period. POVERTY captures the 
poverty rate, and RELSPEND reflects the district to labor market spending ratio, and REGION 
reflects region of the country.  represents the between district error and  represents the 
standard error. These findings suggest that the variance in average ARRA funding that 
indicates increased funding for districts under desegregation is due to other factors. Given the 
relatively low r-squared values for these models, other variables not included in these models 






Regression Model Examining ARRA Funding and Desegregation Status 
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N 28419  28419  28419  
R2 0.334  0.051  0.241  
Note. Standardized beta coefficients = * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
Standard errors in parentheses 
 
When looking at all the finance data from 2008 through 2013 together, they indicate 
that the gap in relative spending between districts without a desegregation order in 1990 and 
those with an order that year grew despite significant ARRA investments in desegregation 
districts. This suggests that these districts were more fiscally fragile and needed substantial 
support from the federal government just to prevent significant fiscal shortfalls. The data also 
indicate that the increased rates of local revenue may have been directed towards filling 
budget gaps from declining state revenues rather than being a concerted local effort to 
increase the amount of overall funding for desegregation districts. 
Discussion 
The analysis in this chapter helps provide answers to the research questions focused on 
the intersection of desegregation and school finance: 
1. Do school finance data for post-unitary districts indicate any change in revenue or 
spending patterns during the post-Dowell era? 
2. Do any changes in spending patterns among post-unitary districts indicate an 
increase or decrease of fiscal support for schools during this period? 
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3. Did fiscal patterns change once court granted districts unitary status? 
The findings in this chapter suggest that there were differing patterns for both 
revenues and expenditures for the three categories of districts included in the analysis. 
Between 1993 and 2013, districts not impacted by the Dowell ruling were more likely than 
either districts that remained under court order or unitary districts to see increases in per-pupil 
spending over the years at a statistically significant level. ARRA funding between 2009 and 
2012 prevented further growth of the expenditure gap between schools not impacted by the 
Dowell ruling and school districts with court orders in place in 1990. The analysis also 
indicates a statistically significant difference in the level of administrative spending across the 
three categories of districts. Districts under court order spent more per pupil on general 
administrative spending than unitary districts and districts never under court order, and the 
amount that unitary districts spent on administrative costs did decline over time after the 
courts terminated desegregation orders. One possibility for further research is a closer 
examination of the link between administrative costs specifically associated with 
desegregation plans and the differing patterns in administrative spending between unitary 
districts and those that remained under court order.  
In addition to differences about expenditures, the analyses in this chapter also found 
differing patterns related to revenue generation. Specifically, the analysis of local revenue 
generation showed that both districts that remained under court order and unitary districts 
generated consistent levels of revenue locally over the 21-year period examined, while 
districts not impact by the Dowell ruling saw statistically significant decreases in the share of 
revenue made up of locally generated funds throughout the later 1990s and into the 2000s, 
before rebounding to early 1990s levels after the Great Recession. Additionally, regression 
 
104 
analysis indicates that both unitary districts and districts that remained under court order were 
more likely to receive ARRA Title I funds from 2008 through 2012.  
Concerning unitary districts, there is evidence that fiscal patterns did change once the 
courts granted districts unitary status. For each of the fiscal variables studied, there was an 
initial change in the years immediately after courts terminated desegregation orders. Per-pupil 
expenditures begin increasing one year after unitary status is granted, and continue to increase 
through year 6, then level off for a few years, before peaking with a .216 beta coefficient 
compared to per-pupil expenditures the year courts terminated the segregation order. General 
administrative spending declines, with statistically significant declines from 5 years after 
courts grant unitary status through 15 years after unitary status. For proportion of revenue 
generated through local sources, there were growing increases that were statistically 
significant five years after districts enter unitary status. Increases continue through year 10, 
where they peak at a .08 beta coefficient higher than the year unitary status began. 
These initial shifts begin to recede the longer districts operate under unitary status. 
Per-pupil spending begins to fall after 11 years under unitary status, ending the period studied 
with a .048 beta coefficient after 22 years in unitary status compared to the base level 
established the year courts granted unitary status. Cuts to administrative spending also peak 
and recede, topping out in year 15 at -0.111 below the level of administrative spending in the 
year the courts terminated desegregation orders, and then rising again to -0.43 level 22 years 
after unitary status was granted. The share of revenue derived from local sources follow a 
similar pattern, with the increase in local revenue declining after peaking at 11 years under 
unitary status and then dropping off through year 15, with evidence of a more modest rebound 
in the final years.  
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These fiscal patterns in unitary districts that occur after the courts terminate 
desegregation cases seem to indicate a pattern of increased fiscal support for unitary districts 
over the first decade of unitary operations, and then a gradual retreat to levels of fiscal support 
like the levels exhibited at the time unitary status was granted. While these shifts in fiscal 
patterns for unitary districts take a decade or more to manifest, it does appear that increased 
fiscal support for districts after they are granted unitary status is not sustained.  
For equity advocates, these findings raise two concerns. First, since districts impacted 
by the Dowell ruling tend to serve more students of color and have higher poverty rates, the 
lower levels of expenditures indicate difficulty in achieving vertical equity in these districts. 
Second, the ARRA funding may have masked a growing funding gap between districts not 
under court order and districts that did have a court order in place in 1991. Further analysis of 
these measures in years to come will be important to further understand the impact of ARRA 
resources on these funding gaps.  
Given the evidence from this examination of spending patterns in districts that remain 
under court order, it is not surprising that these districts struggled to make substantial progress 
towards closing racial achievement gaps or attracting more diverse constituents to their school 
districts. In the absence of resources needed to ensure a satisfactory education for all students, 
desegregation orders served as an essentially unfunded mandate that may have prevented 
policies that would accelerate desegregation, but lacked the tangible assets needed to 
proactively implement new strategies or initiatives that would accelerate integration and racial 
equity.  
Funding patterns in unitary districts indicate that there are initial efforts to increase 
spending, cut administrative spending, and increase local efforts to generate education 
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funding, but that each of these patterns fades over time. This may indicate that while there is 
an initial focus on using fiscal resources to shape the post-unitary education funding, this 
effort is not sustained over time. These drops in student spending in unitary districts come 
despite evidence that these districts cut administrative spending and increase the proportion of 
revenue generated from local sources over the same period after release. These findings seem 
to indicate that unitary districts have fewer resources to work with after being released from 
court oversight, and that any efforts to redirect spending or generate additional local revenue 
are not likely to offset the overall drop in student spending after release from court order. This 
reduction in resources may complicate efforts to maintain and improve outcomes for all 
students and maintain equitable opportunities for students regardless of race in the aftermath 




ANALYSIS OF EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT 
Any analysis examining the impact of the Dowell decision and subsequent 
terminations of court-ordered desegregation plans must include some analysis of educational 
attainment for minority students in districts that had histories of de jure segregation. In these 
communities, educational attainment had been one of the key social and economic 
gatekeepers that stood in the way of promoting racial equity. At the same time, minority 
groups across the nation have seen educational attainment as a primary vehicle for economic 
mobility and social integration. Rury and Hill (2015) pointed out that a concerted effort on the 
part of black students, families, educators, and civil rights leaders significantly closed the 
graduation gap between Black and White students from 1940 to 1980.  
From an economic standpoint, education attainment has become even more important 
in the 21st century. In 1973, 72% of the workforce found employment with a high school 
degree or less, including nearly a third of workers that had not completed high school 
(Symonds, Schwartz, & Ferguson, 2011). By 2007, only 1 in 10 workers were able to find 
employment without a high school degree (Symonds et al., 2011). Further, the majority of 
American jobs now require at least some postsecondary education—education that is not 
obtainable without first attaining a high school diploma (Symonds, et al., 2011).  
Given the importance of high school graduation as a milestone for economic security, 
this analysis focuses on the following research questions: 
1. How did educational attainment vary between schools not under court order, 
schools that were under court order, and schools that courts declared unitary 
between 1993 and 2013? 
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2. Did patterns in education attainment change after courts declared districts unitary? 
Methodology 
This study used a 20-year panel of school level data from 13,389 high schools from 
1993 through school year 2013, and included data on high schools located in the 480 school 
districts where court-ordered desegregation rulings were in effect at the time of the Supreme 
Court’s Dowell decision. A full description of the dataset is available in Chapter 1.  
While postsecondary attainment has become increasingly important for economic 
security and equality, the high school diplomas is still the critical milestone for educational 
attainment. High school graduation rates have received considerable national attention over 
the past decade, but unfortunately, there is no data source that consistently reports the number 
of graduates from each high school in the U.S. for the period between the Dowell decision and 
the adoption of the Adjusted Cohort Graduation (ACGR) rate by the U.S. Department of 
Education in 2008. However, a metric referred to as “promoting power” serves as a proxy for 
measuring education attainment prior to the adoption of the ACGR. DePaoli, Balfanz, and 
Bridgeland (2016) provide the following definition of promoting power in the Building a 
Grad Nation report from the America’s Promise Alliance: 
Promoting Power is an estimated graduation rate developed by the Everyone 
Graduates Center at Johns Hopkins University School of Education. It compares the 
number of twelfth-grade students in a school to the number of ninth-graders three 
years earlier by using the grade level enrollment numbers reported to the federal 
Common Core of Data. Promoting Power does not account for students who make it 
to twelfth grade but ultimately do not graduate, nor does it adjust for transfers in or 
out. In the absence of uniform, school-level graduation rates, Promoting Power 
enables up-to-date comparisons to be made across states and schools (DePaoli et al., 
2016, p. 89) 
 
For example, if a school has promoting power of 90% or more, it means that the 
number of 12th-graders is at least 90% of the number of 9th-graders four years earlier. If a 
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school has promoting power of 60% or less, it means that the number of 12th-graders is 60% 
or less of the number of 9th-graders four years earlier (Balfanz & Legters, 2005).  
Data drawn from the U.S. Department of Education’s Common Core of Data can be 
used to calculate historic levels of promoting power. This makes promoting power a feasible 
proxy for educational attainment. Balfanz and Legters (2005), however, note two main 
limitations with using promoting power to estimate graduation rates. First, promoting power 
does not take into account students who make it to the 12th grade but do not graduate, 
creating the potential to overestimate graduation rates based on promoting power if a large 
number of 12th graders do not complete their diplomas. Second, promoting power can 
underestimate graduation rates for high schools in communities that have high rates of net out 
migration because of demographic shifts, school changes, or losses of major employers. 
Through 2005, analysis of available migration data, however, shows that no more than 5% of 
high schools are likely to be affected by high rates of net out migration between 9th and 12th 
grade (Balfanz & Legters, 2005). Schools with promoting power greater than 100% are 
schools in which transfers into the school exceed transfers out and nearly all freshmen are 
being promoted to 12th grade in the standard number of years, or when two or more schools 
are consolidated into one after the first year of high school for the cohort being analyzed. 
Schools reporting promoting power rates of greater than 120% were tagged in the analysis 
and excluded from some calculations. 
In addition to measuring schools’ promoting power as part of this analysis, this 
chapter also focuses on a subset of schools with especially low promoting power. These 
schools, labeled “dropout factories” by Balfanz and Legters (2004), have promoting power 
rates of 60% or lower. As Balfanz and Legters noted, “High schools with weak promoting 
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power are overwhelmingly majority minority. A majority minority high school is five times 
more likely to have weak promoting power than a majority white school” (2004, p. 5). 
Because previous studies have established a strong link between racial composition and 
promoting power, examining the relationship between a district’s legal desegregation status 
and whether or not its high schools were dropout factories seems relevant to the research 
questions and larger themes of this analysis. 
To analyze differences across the three subsets of school districts included in this 
dissertation, a series of regressions was conducted to contrast the results produced by the 
different districts. The specification for this multiple regression is: 
Yit = α+(DESEGit * YEARi) + βPOVERTYit + LOCALEit + REGIONit +it+it 
 
Y represents promoting power for high school i in year t, and is the dependent variable in 
these models. The independent variables include DESEG which represents the district 
desegregation status in each period and YEAR represents the calendar year for that period. 
POVERTY captures the poverty rate, and LOCALE reflects the NCES locale code, and 
REGION reflects region of the country.  represents the between district error and  
represents the standard error. All calculations for these regressions comparing subsets of 
districts are reported using standardized coefficients and also report standard errors.  
To further analyze the association between a declaration of unitary status and its 
potential association with the fiscal variables being analyzed in this chapter, several of the 
analyses employ a fixed-effects regression model. Employing this approach controls allows 
for examination of several time-varying predictors, and also controls for time-invariant 
characteristics of unitary districts that might introduce bias into the equations (Greene 2002; 
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Dranove, 2012;). The equations for these fixed-effects models include only independent 
variables that are time-sensitive, and are specified as: 
Yit=POSTORDit+POVERTYit +it+
In this fixed-effects equation, Y is the respective fiscal variable being analyzed (either 
overall spending, administrative spending, or revenue generated from local sources). 
POSTORD refers to the number of year a district has operated under unitary status and 
POVERTY captures the poverty rate for that district in that year of unitary status. Individual 
fixed effects are represented by and therefore control for all time-insensitive characteristics 
and is the standard error term3. All 1,185 high schools from the 215 unitary districts were 
included in these models, with each district featuring a different number of observations based 
on how many years it operated under unitary status. Altogether, the fixed effects models in 
this chapter include 15,913 observations. All calculations are reported as standardized 
coefficients, and they also report standard errors.  
Findings 
First, the analysis reports descriptive statistics for the three subcategories of schools 
examined in this study. The three subcategories are: 
• high schools located in districts that were not under court-ordered desegregation 
plans at the time of the Dowell ruling; 
                                                          
3 Fixed-effects regressions were calculated in STATA, which creates dummy variables for all observations with 
one omitted, and also dummy variables for each of the years operating under unitary status (1-22).  STATA then 
uses these dummy variables to calculate the fixed effects regression. (Torres-Reyna, 2007). 
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• high schools that were located in districts that were under court-supervised 
desegregation plans at the time of the Dowell ruling and continued under court 
supervision through 2010; and 
• high schools located in districts that the courts had granted unitary status by 2010.  
Table 5.1 includes the number of high schools for each year of the panel, as well as the 
mean and median promoting power for each subcategory. Schools with a promoting power 
greater than 120% were excluded from the calculations, as these results are typically the result 
of opening or closing school campus. The descriptive statistics indicate that schools not 
impacted by the Dowell agreement have a higher promoting power in both 1993 and 2013. 
The gap between districts not under court order and the other two categories closes somewhat 
between 1993 and 2013. 
Table 5.1 
















Not Under Order 8,377 0.81 0.841 10,325 0.828 0.863 
Never Released 1,023 0.643 0.659 1,624 0.711 0.737 
Unitary 893 0.652 0.675 1,185 0.714 0.747 
 
Figure 5.1 graphs the trend of mean promoting power over time for each of the subsets 
of districts included in the dataset. These trends indicate that all three categories of districts 
saw declines in promoting power throughout the 1990s and then a gradual rebound throughout 
the 2000s and 2010s. While the overall patterns are similar, districts impacted by the Dowell 
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had much lower initial levels of mean promoting power and experienced sharper declines in 
graduation rates in the 1990s. Further, the promoting power gap between districts without a 
court order in 1991 and districts affected by the Dowell ruling do not substantially close over 
the 21-year period studied here.  
 
Figure 5.1. Mean Promoting Power Rates, 1993-2013 
While these patterns in the descriptive statistics provide some evidence of differing 
patterns of educational attainment, further analysis is needed to determine if these trends are 
statistically significant. To determine the significance of the results and further explore the 
relationship between promoting power and desegregation status, I constructed a series of 
regressions using the specifications described in the methodology section of this chapter. 




















































































































Regression Results, Promoting Power and Desegregation Status, Models 1-6 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Never Released -0.203*** -0.106*** -0.081*** -0.061*** -0.056***  
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)  
Unitary -0.206*** -0.146*** -0.116*** -0.065*** -0.063***  
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)  
Desegregation 
Status#Year 




Poverty Rate   -0.330*** -0.318*** -0.252*** -0.305*** -0.306*** 
  (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Mid-Size City   0.004 0.047*** 0.040*** 0.041*** 
   (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Urban Fringe, Large City   0.101*** 0.149*** 0.129*** 0.130*** 
   (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Urban Fringe, Mid-Size 
City 
  0.077*** 0.114*** 0.101*** 0.101*** 
   (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Large Town   0.024*** 0.036*** 0.034*** 0.035*** 
   (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Small Town   0.136*** 0.184*** 0.181*** 0.182*** 
   (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Rural   0.180*** 0.254*** 0.246*** 0.247*** 
   (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Border Region    0.057*** 0.055*** 0.055*** 
    (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Northeast Region    0.207*** 0.196*** 0.194*** 
    (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Midwest Region    0.174*** 0.163*** 0.162*** 
    (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
West Region    0.092*** 0.085*** 0.084*** 
    (0.001) (0.001) (0.00130) 




N 260337 259378 258463 239367 239367 239367 
R2 0.075 0.172 0.191 0.225 0.253 0.255 
Note. Standardized beta coefficients = * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
Standard errors in parentheses 
 
 
The results show that in each of the models, both of the subsets of districts impacted 
by the Dowell decision are statistically linked to lower levels of promoting power. This 
negative correlation weakens as additional explanatory variables are introduced into the 
regression equations. Poverty rate is included in Models 2 through 6 and demonstrates a 
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negative, statistically significant association with promoting power that is more negative than 
the association with desegregation status. When locale is introduced to the regression equation 
in Models 3 through 6, the equations use large cities (defined by the National Center of 
Education Statistics as a central city of the metropolitan area with a population of at least 
250,000) as the base, and the coefficients for locales show that they are positively associated 
with promoting power compared to large cities. Likewise, when the region variable is 
introduced, the South region is used as a base level, and other regions of the country 
demonstrate a positive, statistically significant relationship with promoting power when 
compared to the South.  
When looking at the trend produced by the coefficients describing the interaction 
between desegregation status and year, we see a pattern somewhat similar to the patterns 
produced by the descriptive statistics. However, the decline in promoting power in the 1990s 
is more pronounced for districts not under court order than the two categories impacted by the 
Dowell decision. This steeper decline is more than offset by the end of the period with a 
steady increase in the association between the absence of a court order in 1991 and improved 
promoting power. While the coefficients produced here are all small (with a range between 
--0.07 and 0.04), they are still notable given the significant impact that failure to graduate 
from high school has on individuals, and how even a small dip in graduation rates could 




Figure 5.2. Standardized Beta Coefficients Representing Interaction between Desegregation 
Status and Year (All coefficients significant at the p<0.001 level) 
These findings indicate that there are somewhat differing patterns in changes in 
median promoting power over the period examined, but they do not explicitly determine how 
promoting power may shift after the courts declare a district unitary. In the analyses above, 
shifts in promoting power were plotted against calendar year regardless of when a district was 
declared unitary. Therefore, the results of promoting power in the year 2000 for unitary 
schools could include a district such as Oklahoma City that had already been released from 
court order nine years earlier in 1991, and a district such as Topeka, Kansas, that had its court 
order terminated just one year earlier in 1999.  
I also conducted fixed-effects, multiple regression analysis focusing specifically on the 
relationship between the percentage of revenue derived from local sources and the length of 
time that unitary districts had been released from their court-ordered desegregation plans 
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described in the methodology section. The results of Model 7 are shown in Table 5.3, and 
coefficients reflecting each year after unitary status is represented in Figure 5.3. 
Table 5.3 
Results of Model 7 Regression Equation Examining Relationship between Promoting Power 
and Years Operating under Unitary Status 
 Model 7  
 Promoting Power Standard Error 
1 year after unitary status declared -0.003 (0.005) 
2 years after unitary status declared -0.003 (0.005) 
3 years after unitary status declared 0.004 (0.006) 
4 years after unitary status declared 0.017** (0.006) 
5 years after unitary status declared 0.026*** (0.006) 
6 years after unitary status declared 0.016* (0.007) 
7 years after unitary status declared 0.016* (0.007) 
8 years after unitary status declared 0.034*** (0.007) 
9 years after unitary status declared 0.033*** (0.008) 
10 years after unitary status declared 0.041*** (0.008) 
11 years after unitary status declared 0.058*** (0.009) 
12 years after unitary status declared 0.070*** (0.010) 
13 years after unitary status declared 0.055*** (0.010) 
14 years after unitary status declared 0.046*** (0.011) 
15 years after unitary status declared 0.060*** (0.012) 
16 years after unitary status declared 0.055*** (0.013) 
17 years after unitary status declared 0.055*** (0.014) 
18 years after unitary status declared 0.037*** (0.016) 
19 years after unitary status declared 0.039*** (0.019) 
20 years after unitary status declared 0.012* (0.024) 
21 years after unitary status declared 0.010* (0.026) 
22 years after unitary status declared 0.001 (0.026) 
Poverty Rate 0.092*** (0.057) 
Mid-Size City 0.000 (.) 
Urban Fringe, Large City 0.030 (0.017) 
Urban Fringe, Mid-Size City -0.023 (0.013) 
Large Town 0.035* (0.018) 
Small Town 0.006 (0.035) 
Rural 0.184*** (0.00685) (0.032) 
N 15163  
R2 0.065  
Note. Standardized beta coefficients = * p < 0.05, ** p 
< 0.01, *** p < 0.001 







Figure 5.3. Coefficients from Years Operating under Unitary Status, Model 7 
The results of Model 7 indicate that, when controlling for other variables, unitary 
districts see a mostly steady increase in promoting power the first 12 years operating under 
unitary status, but then a pattern of decline in the second decade of unitary status, with an 
overall net neutral correlation with promoting power. Overall, Model 7 accounts for an only 
small amount of the overall variance in promoting power, with an R-squared value of .065.  
Dropout Factories 
In addition to analyzing the promoting power rates for each of the subsets of schools 
in the dataset, the analysis also examined the presence of dropout factories over time in each 
of the subsets of high schools. Table 5.4 shows the number of dropout factories compared to 







































































629 1023 61% 627 1347 47% 438 1645 27% 
Unitary 569 893 64% 581 1180 49% 901 1236 73% 
 








1198 19% 55% 1208 19% 37% 1339 22% 54% 
 
As Table 5.4 indicates, high schools in districts impacted by the Dowell decision are 
overrepresented in the number of dropout factories, accounting for over half of the dropout 
factories, while only making up around 20% of the number of high schools overall. While the 
number of dropout factories, along with the proportion of all high schools made up of dropout 
factories drops significantly within the “never released” and “unitary” categories, the 
overrepresentation of these categories remains stable between 1993 and 2013.  
One notable statistic that stands out in Table 5.4 is the 2013 percentages of schools 
designated as dropout factories in each category. While the percentage of high schools 
qualifying as dropout factories in districts that remained under court order dropped 
substantially, from 61% to 27%, the percentage of high schools in unitary districts qualifying 
as dropout factories actually increased—from 64% to 73%. In fact, in 2013, over one-third 
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(36%) of dropout factories were located in unitary districts, despite the fact that unitary 
districts operated only 9% of the high schools in the sample that year. A chi-squared test was 
performed to analyze these relationships between dropout factory designation and 
desegregation status.  
Discussion 
It is clear from the findings that different patterns of education attainment existed 
between the three different categories of districts examined in this chapter. Promoting power 
was much higher in districts not impacted by the Dowell decision, and although these districts 
experienced more pronounced declines in promoting power throughout the 1990s, a 
substantial gap exists between districts not under court order and those districts affected by 
the Dowell decision throughout the entire 21-year panel.  
These differing patterns of education attainment are also apparent when investigating 
the prevalence of dropout factories in the three subsets of school districts. The 
overrepresentation of dropout factories in districts either under court order or operating under 
unitary status indicates a concentration of high schools struggling with education attainment 
within these districts. Given the substantial consequences individuals face when they do not 
obtain a high school diploma, this concentration of likely dropouts in communities grappling 
with the vestiges of de jure segregation may not be surprising, but it is concerning. While 
outside of the scope of the data analysis of this chapter, it is likely that many of the districts 
either still under court order or with unitary designation are historically distressed 
communities, and a clustering of high school dropouts in these communities will only 
exacerbate stress on the economics, social welfare, and public health of these school districts.  
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Regarding the question of whether patterns in education attainment shift after the 
courts release districts from court-ordered desegregation plans, there are reasons to be 
concerned for unitary districts. The fixed-effects analysis demonstrated that over time, 
increases in promoting power stall and then recede. This is particularly concerning because 
these declines are happening during the same period when schools not impacted by Dowell 
and schools that remain under court order see the greatest increases in their promoting power. 
This contradictory trend warrants a closer analysis between educational access and the 
termination of desegregation orders in future research, and should serve as caution to potential 
plaintiffs mulling a suit pressing for unitary status. Further research should also examine the 
strategies and policies put in place regarding high schools in unitary districts to gain a better 
understanding of what contributed to this sustained increase in promoting power, and 
determine how these strategies or policies could affect educational attainment policies in the 
future.  
This analysis of educational attainment is limited by its use of promoting power as a 
proxy. Future studies that could calculate adjusted cohort graduation rate for schools 
historically may provide a more detailed look at high school completion during this period. 
Additionally, the decreasing likelihood of a high school diploma alone leading to a career that 
provides economic security should prompt additional research on the impact of court-ordered 
segregation plans on postsecondary education access and attainment, and ultimately 






The findings presented in the previous three chapters provide significant evidence that 
unitary districts followed a different trajectory than either districts not impacted by the Dowell 
ruling or districts that remained under court order through 2010. In Chapter 3, analyses of 
racial composition find that regardless of the desegregation metric included, every analytical 
model produced statistically significant results that demonstrated that districts under court 
order at the time of the Dowell ruling had substantially different patterns of segregation from 
1993 through 2013. These differences persisted in both binary and multi-group measures of 
segregation, and affected both black and Hispanic students. While the racial composition of 
all districts changed regardless of their experiences with legal segregation, this does not 
explain the differences in segregation levels for each subset of district.  
In addition to finding both overall changes in racial composition and differing patterns 
of segregation across the subsets of districts analyzed, this chapter demonstrates that there is a 
relationship between granting unitary status, and the impact of this status and increasing 
segregation levels over time. These analyses validate the findings of Reardon et al. (2012), 
Lutz (2006, 2011), Clotfelter, Vigdor, and Ladd (2006) and others that progress towards 
integration slows and ultimately reverses once court-ordered desegregation plans are 
terminated, and that this reversal is more than just chance or the result of the larger 
demographic shifts in the country’s public schools. 
Chapter 4 demonstrated that districts impacted by the Dowell ruling also have 
different patterns related to district finance. Districts not under court order were consistently 
able to spend more per pupil than districts with active court orders and those operating under 
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unitary status. These higher expenditures in districts not under order persisted despite districts 
impacted by Dowell having had higher local tax burdens over the period studied. The findings 
in Chapter 4 also contradict the argument made by the plaintiffs in some unitary cases that 
terminating court orders will free up resources to redirect to instruction. Instead, this analysis 
found that administrative expenditures initially surge after court orders are terminated, and 
even after this initial increase recedes, districts never realize a savings in administrative 
spending. The finance analysis also found that while unitary districts were able to spend more 
on students for some time after court orders terminated, these efforts could not be sustained 
long-term.  
In Chapter 5, an examination focused on educational attainment showed that court-
monitored and unitary districts had much lower rates of educational attainment in 1993, and 
that a significant gap in education attainment narrowed somewhat but persisted for the 
duration of the timeframe studied. While the number of schools deemed “dropout factories” 
shrank over the 21-year period studied, these high schools with very low levels of education 
attainment were overrepresented in the subsets of districts impacted by the Dowell decision. 
In unitary school districts, increases in promoting power were not sustained, and the net effect 
over the two decades studied shows no increase in promoting power. Equally concerning, the 
prevalence in dropout factories increased in unitary districts between 1993 and 2013. This 
concentration of dropout factories occurred despite statistical analysis showing a sustained 
improvement in promoting power, a proxy for education attainment, in the two decades 
following the declaration of unitary status.  
There are several limitations to the findings in this dissertation, as well as numerous 
opportunities for further research. First, while the NCES dataset provided the opportunity to 
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examine a large number of school districts across the period studied, it was still limited to 
variables that were consistently collected from all states. This resulted in difficulty measuring 
educational achievement due to state-by-state variance in standards and assessments. 
Additionally, given that states did not adopt a common calculation for graduation rates until 
2008, the less accurate measure of promoting power was used to measure graduation rates. 
This study also sacrificed depth for breadth. By examining patterns across all 480 
districts impacted by the Dowell decision, this dissertation left many questions about 
individual districts unanswered. Further research should take a case study approach to 
examining the path to an individual district’s unitary declaration. Additionally, research that 
focuses on specific districts would allow for further study of educational achievement, 
intradistrict equity of resource allocation and racial composition, and the impact of district-
specific policies such as tracking or discipline policies that may not emerge from a study with 
a national scope.  
Finally, while this analysis identifies several notable patterns where unitary school 
districts differ from other districts, the analytical models do not answer the question of what 
causes these differing patterns. I hope that this research serves as a springboard for other 
scholars to dig deeper into the patterns identified here, and to build analytical models that 
answers questions of causation.  
Implications—A Reconsideration of Dowell 
These trends also prompt a reconsideration of the arguments that drove both the 
majority and dissenting opinions in Oklahoma City v. Dowell. Specifically, the results of the 
analysis of 21 years of data from the three subsets of districts examined in this dissertation 
allow for a more informed perspective on the central debate of the Supreme Court’s writings 
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in the Dowell case, which focused on how to define “unitary” status. In the Dowell decision, 
the five-justice majority recommended a limited, mechanical approach to determining unitary 
status, while the three dissenting justices focused on the concept of the “vestiges” of 
segregation, and the potential consequences of a weaker, narrower set of standards for 
determining unitary status (Christopher, 1991). 
In the majority opinion of the Dowell decision, Chief Justice Rheinquist wrote that 
when the district court reconsiders granting unitary status, “the District Court should look not 
only at student assignments, but ‘to every facet of school operations—faculty, staff, 
transportation, extracurricular activities and facilities’ [as cited in Green v. New Kent County 
1968]” (Board of Education v. Dowell, 1991, p. 498). This technical definition of unitary 
status allowed school districts to focus on the efforts they had made towards erasing policies 
that generated de jure segregation rather than the prevalence of racial isolation in Oklahoma 
City and other school districts seeking to terminate desegregation plans. The majority opinion 
also downplayed issues of intent and historical context when considering when to end a court 
order. Indeed, Chief Justice Rheinquist wrote in the majority opinion: 
A district court need not accept at face value the profession of a school board which 
has intentionally discriminated that it will cease to do so in the future. But in deciding 
whether to modify or dissolve a desegregation decree, a school board’s compliance 
with previous court orders is obviously relevant… Not only do the personnel of school 
boards change over time, but the same passage of time enables the District Court to 
observe the good faith of the school board in complying with the decree. The test 
espoused by the Court of Appeals would condemn a school district, once governed by 
a board which intentionally discriminated, to judicial tutelage for the indefinite future. 
Neither the principles governing the entry and dissolution of injunctive decrees nor the 
commands of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment require any 




In his dissenting opinion, Justice Marshall stridently opposed this framework for the 
consideration of unitary status. Justice Marshall noted that the Oklahoma City district 
operated under a segregated school system that was mandated by the state constitution from 
the state’s founding in 1906 through the Brown I decision in 1954—a period of de jure 
segregation that lasted 48 years. After the initial Brown decision, Oklahoma City resisted 
desegregation for another 18 years until the courts finally imposed a meaningful 
desegregation plan in 1972. Further, Justice Marshall noted that the district implemented this 
mandatory desegregation plan for only five years before petitioning the courts to terminate the 
plan in 1977. Justice Marshall and the other dissenting justices in the Dowell case argue that, 
against this historical backdrop where segregated schools were the de jure status for over 60 
years, five years of technical compliance to a mandated desegregation plan was insufficient 
evidence that the underlying vestiges and stigma associated with segregated schools had been 
removed. As Justice Marshall wrote: 
The majority today suggests that 13 years of desegregation was enough. The Court 
remands the case for further evaluation of whether the purposes of the injunctive 
decree were achieved sufficient to justify the decree’s dissolution. However, the 
inquiry it commends to the District Court fails to recognize explicitly the threatened 
reemergence of one-race schools as a relevant “vestige” of de jure segregation. 
(Oklahoma City v. Dowell, 1991, p. 498) 
 
In addition to opposing the idea that technical compliance with a desegregation order 
over a short period provided sufficient evidence for terminating a court order, Justice 
Marshall also resisted the idea that unitary status should be based solely on technical 
compliance with desegregation orders. In his dissent to the Oklahoma City v. Dowell decision, 
Justice Thurgood Marshall wrote:  
By focusing heavily on present and future compliance with the Equal Protection 
Clause, the majority’s standard ignores how the stigmatic harm identified in Brown 
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I can persist even after the State ceases actively to enforce segregation. It was not 
enough in Green, for example, for the school district to withdraw its own enforcement 
of segregation, leaving it up to individual children and their families to “choose” 
which school to attend. For it was clear under the circumstances that these choices 
would be shaped by and perpetuate the state-created message of racial inferiority 
associated with the school district’s historical involvement in segregation. In sum, our 
school desegregation jurisprudence establishes that the effects of past discrimination 
remain chargeable to the school district regardless of its lack of continued enforcement 
of segregation, and the remedial decree is required until those effects have been finally 
eliminated. (Oklahoma City v. Dowell, 1991, p. 498) 
 
The results of the research findings in this dissertation provide some validation to the 
concerns that Justice Marshall expressed in this passage. While unitary districts may have 
removed all evidence of de jure segregation policies, these analyses provide evidence that 
segregation and unequal outcomes not only persisted but also accelerated after unitary 
declarations. Because the patterns are unique to unitary districts, it raises enough questions 
that further research should explore questions of whether unitary declarations caused rises in 
segregation and decreases in spending and educational attainment in unitary districts between 
1993 and 2013. 
Implications for Unitary Districts 
Additional concerns arise when these research results are considered in the perspective 
of a political economy framework. Throughout the 1990s and 2000s, numerous political, 
policy, and judicial forces pushed for more equity in public education. Despite frequent, often 
well-founded criticisms of the accountability movement generally and the No Child Left 
Behind Act specifically, these initiatives received support from civil right groups because they 
held schools accountable for helping all students learn (DeBray-Pelot & McGuinn, 2009). 
Since the Dowell ruling, numerous plaintiffs have won court battles focused on equity in 
school funding, winning about two-thirds of these cases (Hunter, 2017). Throughout the 
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1990s, and to a lesser extent in the mid-2000s, a strong economy blunted some of the worst 
effects of inequity. Finally, the federal government actively pursued equity and equality 
through the Office of Civil Rights at both the Departments of Justice and Education for most 
of the years between 1993 and 2013. Given all of these forces pushing for equity, it is 
reasonable to hypothesize that advocates for unitary status were reacting against a 
pro-equality climate during the 1990s and 2000s.  
Considering that unitary districts exhibited a shift toward higher levels of segregation 
despite an overall climate that promoted equity, it is troubling to consider what may happen to 
unitary districts in the future given shifts in the political, judicial, and economic climate over 
time. The Supreme Court’s decisions in Meredith v. Jefferson and Parents Involved in 
Community Schools (PICS) v. Seattle Public Schools significantly curtail the ability of unitary 
districts to address racial inequality once the courts terminate mandatory desegregation plans. 
For example, the Dowell majority opinion, in arguing that there were still opportunities to 
promote racial equity in the district noted, “Any student could transfer from a school where he 
or she was in the majority to a school where he or she would be in the minority. Faculty and 
staff integration was retained, and an “equity officer” was appointed.” These policies would 
likely be impermissible today given the Meredith and PICS decisions.  
In addition to this weakening of judicial routes to promote racial equality, the 
evolution of federal education policy from NCLB to the Every Student Succeeds Act (ESSA) 
has resulted in a significant weakening of the ability of the U.S. Department of Education to 
affect educational outcomes for disadvantaged students. Further, the philosophy and tone of 
the Trump administration towards the federal role in education and advocacy for civil rights 
raises serious questions about whether the federal government will exert significant effort to 
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leverage what authority it does have on behalf of increasing racial equity in education. This 
shift in federal policy and priorities allows individual states and communities to implicitly—
and in some cases explicitly—pursue agendas that result in racial segregation in schools.  
Indeed, several instances of apparently blatant de jure segregation have surfaced in 
recent years. In Gardendale, Alabama, white residents are pressing to secede from Jefferson 
County schools (Rosen, 2016), which includes the city of Birmingham, which has been under 
court order since 1971. Residents of mostly white St. George, Louisiana, have been seeking to 
break off from the majority-minority East Baton Rouge Parish School System since 2013 
(Barlow, 2015). The secession movements follow many of the patterns established when a 
number of schools in the Kansas City, Missouri School District seceded and were 
subsequently annexed by the Independence, Missouri school district in 2007 (Herl, 2011). 
Both East Baton Rouge and Kansas City, Missouri, had their court-ordered desegregation 
plans terminated in 2003, giving district secessionists an easier to break off from the school 
districts. In the case of Gardendale, a district judge ruled in April 2017 that the Birmingham 
suburb could secede, despite fears of a racial motive (Brown, 2017).  
Given the overall shift away from a focus on equity, it is a reasonable concern that the 
trends documented in this dissertation may increase in severity or accelerate the rate of 
change. Researchers and policymakers should continue to closely monitor segregation metrics 
as well as measures of educational equity in unitary districts and call attention to further shifts 
in racial composition, spending patterns, and educational attainment as well as continue to 
find additional data sources that allow for further study of the impact of unitary status on 




Implications for Districts that Remain under Court Order 
These findings also have important implications for districts that continue to operate 
under the guidelines of court-ordered desegregation plans. These analyses suggest that there 
are notable consequences associated with unitary status, and that some of the supposed 
benefits, such as decreased administrative spending may not cover the costs of a shift to 
unitary status. Additionally, shifts in the legal landscape since the Dowell ruling constrain 
districts’ ability to factor race into district policy once unitary status is conveyed, and districts 
should proceed carefully when weighing the benefits of seeking unitary status. Given the 
evidence presented here, districts that remain under court supervision would do well to 
carefully consider Justice Marshall’s concerns in his dissenting opinion in the Dowell case 
and consider whether all vestiges of segregation have truly been eliminated from their school 
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